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Introduction 
 
The Revolutionary War granted the United States independence, but did not define the 
country’s relationship with the rest of the world.  In the years that followed, the US fought wars 
with the Barbary States of North Africa, France, and Britain in an attempt to secure the nation’s 
rights as a free state.  Because most of these conflicts were fought at sea, the nation was forced to 
recreate the Navy that it had eagerly disbanded after the Revolution. 
In fairness, one could argue that the Continental Navy was best forgotten.  With a few 
notable exceptions, its track record was abysmal; one historian described it as a “wasteful and 
humiliating fiasco.”1  But unlike its predecessor, the new US Navy was (presumably) a 
permanent, professional organization.  Its officer corps joined the service in their youth, and 
usually remained in the Navy for their entire careers – where the previous navy had usually 
appointed officer ranks based on a candidate’s experience in state navies, the merchant marine, 
or privateering.2   
As the Navy was founded, so was its first generation of officers.  These men entered the 
service as young adults in midshipman or lieutenant positions, and were the first large body of 
men who became captains after being trained within the Navy itself.  In his book Preble’s Boys: 
Commodore Preble and the Birth of American Sea Power, Fletcher Pratt explains that, early in 
their careers, many officers of this generation served under Commodore Edward Preble – the 
commander of the Mediterranean Squadron for much of the First Barbary War.  These officers 
                                                           
1
 Ian W. Toll, Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2006), 15. For more on the Continental Navy not being a significant part of the heritage of the US Navy, 
see Christopher McKee, "Edward Preble and the 'Boys:' The Officer Corps of 1812 Revisited," in Command Under 
Sail: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1775-1850, ed. James C. Bradford (Annapolis, MD: United States 
Naval Institute, 1985), 73.  
2
 Christopher McKee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 
1794-1815 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 40-53. 
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called themselves “Preble’s Boys” presumably after an occasion when the Commodore had 
complained that the officers assigned to his command were “Nothing but a pack of boys!”3  After 
their service, many of these officers were highly successful in the later wars, and came to 
symbolize the Navy in the eyes of the public.  This group of men includes many of the most 
famous naval officers to this day.  Pratt’s main thesis is that Preble’s Boys learned their skills for 
success primarily from Commodore Preble, and that these skills caused them to emerge as the 
dominate members of the first generation of officers by achieving the vast majority of victories – 
particularly in the War of 1812.4  
However, as naval historian Christopher McKee points out, Preble’s Boys happened to have 
seniority over many of their colleagues, so they held almost all of the ship commands in the later 
wars.5  In other words, they achieved their ranks and victories for the same reason they served 
with Preble: their seniority.  Furthermore, some of the officers in Pratt’s group had almost no 
direct association at all with Preble during a brief period under his command.6  Consequently the 
idea of “Preble’s Boys” as a group of officers who defined the Navy because of their single 
common mentor is unrealistic.  However, the generation of which this group was a part – which 
shared not a single mentor, but a common group of senior officer mentors, and whose members 
were promoted to their ranks, rather than appointed – did define the Navy.  In this paper, the 
term “Preble’s Boys” will refer to the officers of this first true generation of US naval officers, 
who were typically senior lieutenants, masters commandant, or captains by the War of 1812 if 
                                                           
3
 Fletcher Pratt, Preble’s Boys: Commodore Preble and the Birth of American Sea Power (New York: William 
Sloane Associates, 1950), 28, 39; McKee instead presents a quote in which Preble refers to them as “a parcel of 
children.”  See McKee, "Edward Preble and the 'Boys,’” 75. 
4
 Pratt, Preble’s Boys, 399-401. 
5
 McKee, “Edward Preble and the ‘Boys,’” 87. 
6
 Pratt, Preble’s Boys, 401. 
2 
they stayed in the service.7  They therefore had the possibility of receiving the command of a 
vessel in wartime, and developing a public reputation through victory in battle.8 
This generation is important to examine because, as the first career professionals in the Navy, 
they had long terms of service in which – with the Navy Department – they contributed to the 
development of the service.  As McKee explains, the element that most shaped the navy was its 
“skillful professional officer corps … [which] was intimately connected with … the civilian 
administration.  Together the two must be considered the organism that was the professional 
Navy … an institution with its own internal élan.”9  A central aspect of the officer corps’ élan 
was its complex code of honor.   
When the US Navy was founded in 1794, many Americans, including such prominent figures 
as Thomas Jefferson, cited among its primary purposes the defense of “National Honor.”10  The 
public also expected its officers to be “honorable” and “gentlemanly” in the fashion of their 
European counterparts.  In short, America’s expectations of “honor” converged in the new Navy 
– ancient concepts of gentleman soldiers and honorable feudal warriors met with new notions of 
“national honor” and public opinion.  
Chapters one and two of this paper describe the early officer corps’ code of honor as it 
applied to the officers’ relations with their peers and the public.  These officers’ personal 
legitimacy depended upon their reputation as honorable gentleman, which meant both adhering 
                                                           
7
 For a list of officers of this generation who survived the War of 1812 to become senior officers in the Navy, see 
the Appendix. 
8
 Experienced lieutenants sometimes commanded small ships.  This was relatively rare, however, and for the rest 
of this paper, lieutenants will be treated as junior officers unless otherwise specified. 
9
 Mckee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession, xi.  Although much of the Navy Department was civilian, a 
“Board of Commissioners,” consisting of three senior Captains, was established in April 1815 to handle much of the 
administration.  Even before 1815, the Secretary of the Navy gave considerable weight to the recommendations of 
senior officers, but after 1815, the policies of the Navy Department and the senior officers tended to be aligned.  See 
Siegel, Jay M, Origins of the Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps: A History of Legal Administration in the 
United States Navy, 1775 to 1967 (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, Judge Advocate General's Corps: 1997), 58-59. 
10
 Jefferson to Adams, July 11, 1786, in Lester J. Cappon ed., The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete 
Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1959), I:142-143. 
3 
to traditional values of personal honor and identifying with the “collective honor” of the nation 
and naval service.  This ideology was especially influential among captains, because they were 
often public figures in the way that generals and admirals are today: There were no admirals, so 
the names of the captains showed up in newspapers during the wars.  Consequently, as Preble’s 
Boys matured and received command of their own ships, many of them developed a public 
image that they were compelled to maintain – and facilitated quarrels with their peers over 
relatively minor issues. 
Chapters three and four outline the resolution of major conflicts of honor and the responses 
of Preble’s Boys and the Navy Department.  The most public and dramatic of these disputes 
were resolved with duels or military tribunals – two final resolutions to quarrels over issues of 
honor.  The two practices differed dramatically: dueling was feudal in origin and was performed 
spontaneously by individuals, while tribunals were theoretically based on Enlightenment ideals 
and were sanctioned by the administration.  Despite their differences, both institutions served 
key roles in the officer corps’ attempts to prove their individual or collective honor.  Both 
processes were relatively public, and thus could validate an officer’s honor to his peers or 
countrymen, maintain the officer corps’ reputation in society, or establish institutional standards 
for honorable conduct by the officers.  Furthermore, most of Preble’s Boys who had lifetime 
careers in the Navy were involved in some capacity in a duel or tribunal.11  Duels and tribunals 
were therefore both a reflection and a source of the culture of honor in the early Navy. 
In the period between 1820 and 1825, however, there was a shift in the role that honor played 
in the officer corps.  A string of high-profile tribunals and a particularly devastating duel shook 
the public perception of the Navy.  Naval historian David C. Skaggs explains that between the 
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 David C. Skaggs, Thomas Macdonough: Master of Command in the Early U.S. Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2003), 203. “Involvement” includes serving as a second in a duel, resolving a duel, or (most 
commonly) sitting on a tribunal. 
4 
War of 1812 and the peak of trials in 1825, “large numbers of the general public … [were] 
appalled not only at the courts-martial but also at the petty quarrels that brought all too many 
officers to the dueling grounds.”12  Most historians typically write off the conflict as a side effect 
of the competition between junior officers in the peacetime Navy.13  Linda Maloney, A 
biographer of one of Preble’s Boys, describes the wave of discord by explaining that “in this 
climate, aggressions formerly expended on the national foe turned inward, and the navy seethed 
with quarrels between officers – with accusations, courts-martial, and duels – reaching a kind of 
crescendo of acrimony in 1825, and gradually declining thereafter”14 
If the discord in the upper tiers of the officer corps between 1820 and 1825 was, in fact, just a 
function of the officer’s competition, one must ask the question of why it declined after 1825; the 
US Navy did not fight another major war until the Mexican-American War in 1846.  While there 
is certainly truth to Maloney’s argument that peacetime competition enflamed the situation when 
the officers had no enemies to focus on, viewing the “crescendo of acrimony” as merely the 
product of the officers’ frustration and boredom ignores the mentality behind these often public 
conflicts.  Instead, the friction was a reflection of the immense value that the officers placed on 
their status and reputations, which were products of personal honor.  1825 was the peak of this 
discord because it is the period when the behavior of Preble’s Boys and the Navy’s civilian 
administration shifted in regards to the role of personal honor in the Navy.  After 1825, the 
service made a significant effort to subdue the culture of personal honor in order to better pursue 
the needs of the US Navy.
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 Skaggs, Thomas Macdonough, 184. 
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 William O. Stevens, An Affair of Honor: The Biography of Commodore James Barron, U.S.N. (Chesapeake, 
VA: Norfolk County Historical Society, 1969), xv. 
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 Linda M. Maloney, The Captain from Connecticut: The Life and Naval Times of Isaac Hull (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1986), 292. 
5 
Chapter I: Personal Honor 
 
The notions of personal honor that governed the first generation of officers in the US Navy 
were not new.  It is not difficult to imagine the concept of personal or familial honor existing in 
some form for millennia.  The particular system of honor that came to dominate in America, 
however, has more recent roots.  Historian William Oliver Stevens argues that this particular 
form of honor first coalesced around 1066 when William the Conqueror took the throne of 
England. Stevens argues that William first introduced the code of chivalry in order to promote 
peaceful relations between his knights, who were prone to frequent infighting. 1  The code of 
chivalry gradually spread throughout Europe as borders and rulers shifted, so that the continent 
and the colonies incorporated similar rules by the time of the French Revolution.2 
In his Treatise on Orders, published in 1610, the French legal scholar Charles Loyseau 
describes the origins of the nobility in France as a product of medieval invasions, and he traces 
the French nobility back to the Frankish invasion of Gaul.  As time went on, knights developed 
into a landed gentry class and the tradition of chivalry gradually evolved, but the core ideas 
remained the same.  The landowning elites – now called the “gentility” because they did not till 
the land for their livelihood – distanced themselves from the peasants who worked their lands 
through privileges or “honors,” which they received based on their status as leaders. 3  The 
French political thinker the baron de Montesquieu, writing in 1748, presented one of the most 
globally influential descriptions of honor in his The Spirit of the Laws.  Writing only a few 
decades before the founding of the Navy, he observed that “the nature of honor is to demand 
                                                           
1
 William O. Stevens, Pistols at Ten Paces: The Story of the Code of Honor in America (Boston: The Riverside 
Press Cambridge, 1940), 2. 
2
 James Bowman, Honor: A History (New York: Encounter Books, 2006), 73. 
3
 Charles Loyseau, "A Treatise on Orders," in The Old Regime and the French Revolution, ed.  
and trans. Keith Baker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 22-23. 
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preferences and distinctions, [and it] can oblige men to do … the difficult actions ... which 
require force, with no reward other than the renown of these actions”4  This same code of honor 
existed in the United States during and after the Revolutionary War, and played a tremendous 
role in governing the relationships in the first generation of officers to come up through the ranks 
of the US Navy. 
 
A Gentleman’s Honor 
According to naval historian Christopher McKee, “of all the definitions of gentleman, the 
one that most closely approximates what the naval officer had in mind when he identified 
himself with the term is that which describes a man who does not engage in any menial 
occupation or in manual labor for gain, and who lives by a certain code of behavior thought 
appropriate to his exalted status”5  By the time of the American and French Revolutions, this 
code of honor was based on several key principles, most of which were directly relevant to the 
early American naval officer corps.  Personal integrity, the fraternal trust between gentlemen, 
bravery, and the importance of a gentleman’s reputation dominated the psyche of the naval 
officers.  These principles defined a gentleman’s “character.” 
Integrity had a slightly different meaning for American gentlemen in the early republic– and 
the officer corps in particular – than it does today.  Honorable gentlemen had an essentially 
uncompromising obligation to keep their word.  Consequently, when a man of honor pledged to 
fulfill a specific duty, he was bound to that duty.  Captain Stephen Decatur was one of Preble’s 
Boys who achieved a level of renown nearly unparalleled by his contemporaries in the Navy 
after he launched a daring raid in the Barbary War to destroy the captured US ship Philadelphia.  
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 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Ch. 7. 
5
 McKee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession, 34. 
7 
Governed as he was by the laws of honor, when Decatur asked his future wife, Susan Wheeler, to 
marry him, he warned her that he had already sworn himself to his country, and that if ever broke 
that vow he would be unworthy of her.  But if she would “accept second place in his devotion, it 
should be hers exclusively and forever.”6  While Decatur’s proposal was not typical, the 
principle of integrity that it expressed was genuine, and was valued immensely by his fellow 
officers.  According to the rule of integrity, deceit was also considered highly dishonorable. 
Another important principle of the early naval officers was the notion that a kind of trust 
existed between all gentlemen.  Closely related to integrity, this perceived fraternity of 
gentlemen existed simultaneously to national allegiance.  The gentleman’s code of honor was 
considered to be universal throughout the western world; anyone claiming to be a gentleman was 
entitled to the respect that one would pay to any other gentlemen, and he would be expected to 
follow the same rules of decorum.  The notion of a sacred trust was especially apparent between 
officers, perhaps because of the tradition of aristocratic officership that dominated Europe.   
One example of the belief in this trust was the phenomenon of “ship-dueling.”  This odd 
practice occurred primarily during the War of 1812, and was usually an attempt by the officers to 
break the stalemates between the US and Britain in America’s blockaded ports.  The numerically 
superior British fleet was able to patrol much of the Atlantic seaboard, forcing many of the US 
Navy’s warships to remain in port under the protection of shore batteries.  With little combat at 
all between the two sides, frustrated captains began issuing challenges to enemy ships of 
comparatively equal size requesting a fair fight.  Relatively few of these “ship duels” actually 
occurred because of concerns among many captains that the ship-pairings were uneven, or 
because the encounters were forbidden by orders, but the fact that challenges were issued at all 
                                                           
6
 Spencer Tucker, Stephen Decatur: A Life Most Bold and Daring (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 
86. 
8 
demonstrates an inherent trust that the challengers felt they shared with the honorable enemy 
officers.7 
The most notable incident of ship-dueling in the War of 1812 was the battle between the 
Shannon and the Chesapeake.  On May 31, 1813, Royal Navy Captain Philip Broke of the frigate 
Shannon issued a challenge to Captain James Lawrence of the US frigate Chesapeake.  In his 
lengthy letter, he wrote:  
I request you will do me the favor to meet the Shannon … Ship to Ship, to try the 
fortune of our respective Flags…. I am therefore induced … to assure you that what 
I write I pledge my honor to perform to the utmost of my power…. I will warn you 
… should any of my Friends be too nigh … or I would sail with you, under a truce 
Flag, to any place you think safest from our Cruisers, hauling it down when fair to 
begin Hostilities…. I entreat you, Sir, not to imagine that I am urged by mere 
personal vanity to the wish of meeting the Chesapeake, or that I depend only upon 
your personal ambition for your acceding to this Invitation: we have both nobler 
motives.  You will feel it as a compliment if I say that the result of our meeting may 
be the most grateful Service I can render to my country; and I doubt not that you, 
[are] equally confident of success8 
 
Broke’s letter also included a detailed list of his ship’s specifications, mentioned that he 
would have to leave the area soon to refill his water, and offered to keep the challenge a secret in 
case Lawrence had been ordered to refuse challenges.  Lawrence never actually received Broke’s 
challenge, however, because he sailed out of Boston on June 1 and, seeing the Shannon alone, 
determined to engage her.  In the violent battle that ensued, Lawrence was killed and the 
Chesapeake was captured.  But Broke’s letter highlights the understanding that naval officers felt 
they shared with other officers – even their enemies.  Naval historian Ian Toll explains that, 
“Broke and Lawrence were brother officers, more deeply beholden to one another than to the 
civilian statesmen they served”9  This sense of fraternity was common among Preble’s Boys, a 
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 Toll, Six Frigates, 425. 
8
 Broke to Lawrence, n.d., quoted in Ibid., 406-415. 
9
 Toll, Six Frigates, 408-409. 
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few of whom issued challenges of their own.  At least Stephen Decatur and Lawrence (in a 
separate incident) are known to have issued challenges to British captains.10  
Another core value associated with honor during the early Republic was bravery.  The 
importance of bravery likely derives from the days of feudal chivalry, but was central to a 
gentleman’s ability to maintain his integrity.  Keeping one’s word or obeying one’s duty often 
placed peopled in difficult situations, so the true test of a gentleman was his bravery – his ability 
to stand up for his duties, to back up his opinion, or to defend his honor when it was called into 
question.  This value was especially prized among members of the officer corps, whose duties 
caused them to risk their lives so frequently.  An accusation of cowardice was one of the worst 
insults to an officer, and an officer who was considered a coward by his peers was often socially 
ostracized.11  Conversely, an act of bravery was one of the most laudable displays of honor.  In 
one such example, in a battle in March 1815 between the sloops-of-war (USS) Hornet and HMS 
Penguin, musket fire from American marines raked the British decks and caused the crew to flee, 
leaving only one lieutenant stubbornly holding his post on the ship’s forecastle.  The American 
officers were so impressed that they prevented their marines from shooting down “so brave a 
man.”12  The military’s fixation on courage as the highest indicator of honor can still be seen 
today in the highest decoration awarded by the US government: the Congressional Medal of 
Honor.  The medal was actually established in December 1861 "to promote the efficiency of the 
Navy."13 
The importance of a gentleman’s reputation was one of the defining characteristics of the 
system of honor.  In the context of honor, reputation typically referred to “the esteem of one’s 
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 Ibid., 408, 425. 
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 Christopher McKee, “The Pathology of a Profession: Death in the United States Navy Officer Corps, 1797-
1815,” War and Society 3, no. 1 (January 1985), 10-11. 
12Quoted in Mckee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession, 147. 
13
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10 
fellows,” and was earned through honorable behavior.14  A gentleman’s reputation or “good 
name” therefore represented his honorable standing among fellow men of character, and insults 
or accusations that tarnished his reputation were the worst kind of attack.  Unfounded accusations 
were seen by honorable men as one of the most base and villainous acts a “gentleman” could 
commit, and could even provoke duels.15 
No one felt the importance of maintaining their honorable reputation as much as public 
figures.  Historian Joanne Freeman notes that to politicians in the early republic, there was no 
greater threat than “disgrace in the public eye.”16  As public figures, the officers placed the same, 
all-consuming emphasis on their reputations.  On July 6 1822, an editorial in the National 
Intelligencer defended the character of Captain Isaac Hull17 from accusations of corruption, 
claiming that “an organized attempt has been made to undermine the character of this man, and 
deprive him of that reputation which is to all men – but particularly to such men as Captain Hull, 
dearer than life.”18  Hull’s colleague Captain Arthur Sinclair explained that sometimes, “life 
must be hazarded to save what’s far more valuable, [a man’s] reputation.”19  The practice of 
dueling perhaps best represents gentlemen’s willingness to risk their lives to protect their 
reputation.  Duels were the final recourse in disputes where a gentleman insulted the honor of 
another gentleman in some way.  The two men would fight a duel (usually with pistols), and the 
participating parties demonstrated their courage–and therefore their honor – to their foes and 
their peers.  
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 Mckee, “Pathology of a Profession,” 1. 
15
 Maloney, Captain from Connecticut, 328.  Since it was not easy to determine the truthfulness of an accusation, 
individuals would often defend their reputations by blaming rumors on deliberate plots to damage their good names. 
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 Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2001), 5. 
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 National Intelligencer, 6 July 1822, quoted in Ibid., 340. 
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 Mckee, “Pathology of a Profession,” 12. 
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Because these officers were well-known throughout society, they desperately valued their 
standing not only among their peers (as a normal gentleman might) but in public opinion.  Their 
renown came primarily from success in battle, so they frantically sought opportunities to fight 
battles to enhance their fame.  Rather than pure vanity, the officers’ thirst for glory was based in 
part on their desire to fulfill their sworn duties as officers, and was crucial to maintaining a 
reputation of gallantry.  In the words of Christopher McKee, it is impossible to understand the 
early officer corps “unless this search for fame – that is, a laudable motivation to exert oneself to 
and beyond the limits of one’s capability – is recognized as a primary element in the ethical air 
breathed by the naval officers.”20   
 
Personal Honor and the American Public 
The system of honor – with its focus on integrity, trust between gentlemen, bravery, and 
reputation – prevailed in Europe and the colonies until the latter half of the eighteenth century.  
Arguably the most radical notion that came from the French and American Revolutions was the 
rejection of a feudal-based system of honor.  Surprisingly, however, American society’s 
attachment to personal honor did not end with the revolution.  Whereas the French Revolution 
(or at least the popular revolution beginning in 1792) had been “bottom up” in that it was 
governed by the demands of the poor and disenfranchised, the American Revolution had been 
led by elites.  Not surprisingly, while the French were purging the gentry from their navy, the US 
Secretaries of the Navy were actively seeking out young men with “a high love of character,” 
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 McKee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession, 47.  It should be noted that there were concrete benefits to 
being considered a “gentleman” (better access to credit, for example), but the officer’s conduct demonstrated that 
they, like the public, typically viewed honor as an end in itself.  This will be discussed later in detail. 
12 
“the honorable and manly feelings of a gentleman,” and “good education” to be the first 
generation midshipmen. 21 
Public officials were also expected to be honorable gentlemen (although it must be admitted 
that in some cases, the American people demonstrated very low standards in their elected 
officials).  While it was not essential that these leaders had a celebrated lineage or vast fortune, 
they needed to be seen domestically and internationally as men with means enough to 
demonstrate their “dignity and Character.”22  This concept should not seem alien: even today, the 
honorable character of candidates is still an important campaign issue in American elections. 
As public officials themselves, the early naval officers – and captains in particular – were 
subject to the same expectations by American society and their peers.  In times of war, this 
expectation was usually met.  The public frequently rewarded the officers’ honorable behavior 
with praise in the form of parades, dinners, awards, and toasts, and their exploits were recounted 
in songs, poems, literature, and newspapers.  Stephen Decatur – the most revered for his bravery 
– received more than his share of these tributes.  His valor was recounted in a drinking song 
attributed to J.R. Calvert, which memorializes the victory of the frigate United States over HMS 
Macedonian in the War of 1812: 
Dame Amphitrite flew to the Archives above, 
To see the great mandate of Neptune recorded, 
When tracing the Records of Lybian Jove, 
To find where renown to brave deeds was awarded; 
There Washington’s name, 
 Recorded by Fame, 
Resplendent as light, to her view quickly came! 
In rapture she cries, “Here Decatur I’ll place, 
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 Ibid., 43-46.  It should be noted that although the aristocrats where purged from the French Navy (and later 
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22
 Freeman, Affairs of Honor, 40. 
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On the page which the deeds of brave Washington grace!23 
Poems such as these demonstrate that many Americans were watching the Navy with interest. 
Unfortunately, the naval officers were not always able to meet the honorable expectations of 
the public.  In 1822, while serving as commander of the Boston Navy Yard, officers working 
with Captain Hull circulated rumors in Boston that he was involved in a ring of corruption at the 
yard.  His attackers also brought up an old and unfounded rumor that in 1811, he had charged 
passage fees to carry American citizens across the British Channel in Constitution.  In the public 
outcry that followed, he was attacked in several newspapers,24 and a group of Harvard students 
even demonstrated and toasted “the venerable father of the American Navy [George 
Washington] – in whose time there were no … guineas paid for passage money.”25  The 
community’s vocal disapproval of Hull when they believed him to be dishonorable demonstrates 
how important an officer’s character was to his legitimacy as a public figure. 
 
The Highest Value of the Officer Corps 
Besides an officer’s public reputation, his other major source of legitimacy was the opinion 
of his peers.  To understand the value of personal honor to the corps, it is necessary to understand 
that, in the eyes of the officers, being a gentleman was literally inherent in officership.  
Logically, then, ungentlemanly conduct severely damaged an officer’s legitimacy – especially in 
the eyes of his peers.  This outlook went without saying in the early Navy, because it was a 
perspective rather than a fact.  The concept is implicitly stated in almost all documents that 
discuss officer’s conflicts and discipline problems, qualifications to lead, or even their 
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perceptions of foreign officers.  In a statement that could easily have been written about the 
Navy officer corps, Freeman writes that political figures during this period “were men of public 
duty and private ambition who identified so closely with their public roles that they often could 
not distinguish between their identity as a gentleman and their status as political leaders.”26  
Since these two personas were fused for officers, members evaluated each other in terms of 
honor.  And because each individual drew his self-worth from his reputation, these judgments 
often became problematic. 
Younger officers – who recognized that their legitimacy came from their claim to personal 
honor, but who were usually too young to have serious matters of honor to dispute – found 
excuses to challenge the character of their peers for sometimes ridiculous reasons.  In one 
incident in 1813, Midshipman Phillips of the Constellation posted a notice in a tavern in Norfolk:  
“I Hereby certify that William L Rodgers [sic] … is destitute of truth, honour, and Courage.”  
Rogers countered this with a flyer challenging him to a duel, and stating that: 
A duty which honor imposes, & Justice Sanctions, compels me to give publicity to 
the following Notice. 
Having publicly Charged Me as devoid of truth & honor…. [I] have No other 
Alternative but to publish [Mr. Phillips] to the world as A Liar & a Coward.   
His having ungenerously held me up to public view without Advertising Me of his 
intention, discovers a heart, devoid of every principle which Constitutes the 
Gentleman [and] Man of honour.”27 
 
Their captain was Charles Stewart, a friend of Decatur’s and another hero of the War of 
1812.  Stewart prevented the duel from occurring; the issue that apparently began the exchange 
was that Phillips had placed some of Rogers’ laundry on a greasy table.  Especially in peacetime, 
disputes between the officers became so frequent that six lieutenants – including James 
Lawrence and Oliver H Perry – petitioned the Secretary of the Navy for the formation of a “court 
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of honor,” to resolve these conflicts peacefully.28  For unknown reasons, such a court was never 
formed. 
This same emphasis on personal honor as a central component to being a good officer can be 
seen in the way Preble’s Boys educated, disciplined, and evaluated their junior officers.  Many 
captains, for example, frequently invited the young officers to dine in their cabins during cruises, 
where they taught them “the proper decorum of gentlemen officers.”29  Captain Thomas 
Macdonough30 forced one of his midshipman to resign during a cruise in the Mediterranean in 
winter 1818-1819 for cheating at cards, which Macdonough considered “ungentlemanly and 
unofficerlike conduct.”31  Additionally, efficiency reports that commanders made of their 
subordinates would describe an officer in such terms as “a gentlemanly officer of sober habits” 
or "the very soul of chivalry, generous, high-minded, gallant, and heroic.”32 
 
Deference and Class 
In contrast to much of the culture and government of the new republic, Congress and the 
Navy Department did not make any serious efforts to change the Navy from a fundamentally 
feudal organization to one based on more democratic principles until more than half a century 
after its founding.  In the meantime, it retained the British – and international – maritime 
tradition of hierarchy based largely on personal honor.  The class distinction within the officer 
corps and between officers and enlisted men justified the authority of an officer over his 
subordinates.  Discipline was crucial to operating a ship on the far side of the world when the 
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common sailors were among the lowliest men of society, and officers were often more concerned 
about their prize money or their status back home than their mission.33  Freeman’s description of 
the perspective of political figures during this period once again applies exceptionally well to the 
corps: the public officials of this period considered honor “much more than a vague sense of self-
worth; it represented the ability to prove oneself a deserving … leader.”34  By this logic, enlisted 
men could not be true “men of honor,” and senior or ranking officers were entitled to greater 
honor and respect than their juniors.  This strict honor-based hierarchy used in the Navy of this 
period could best be described as one of “deference,” which McKee defines particularly well as: 
An ethos predicated on the notion that God (or Nature) had ordained a social and 
economic hierarchy in which some men were placed high and others low; that those 
who were placed higher had a right and a duty to command and to lead; that it was 
the duty of those placed in subordinate stations to obey their leaders and to be 
content in their lowly positions in life; and finally that the good of the whole social 
order depended on respecting this hierarchical social structure, for without that 
ordered ranking anarchy, destruction, and other unnamable evils would ensue.35 
 
Nowhere was the supremacy of deference in the Navy more obvious than in the interactions 
between officers and sailors.  One of the primary values that older officers taught their 
subordinates was the importance of maintaining “command presence” by remaining aloof from 
the enlisted men.36  As almost all officers recognized, fraternizing with sailors and marines – or 
even with people on shore deemed to be “too common” – could undermine the class distinction 
between the gentlemen officers and their enlisted charges.  Midshipmen who could not learn to 
maintain this division were speedily removed from the service.  In 1811, Captain Hugh Campbell 
arrested a midshipman on charges of “ungentlemanly and unofficerlike conduct” for “taking for 
his associates the common prostitutes and sailors, and this in open day to the disgrace of himself 
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and the service.”37  Other midshipman were arrested or dismissed for offenses such as 
“associating with the common soldiers” or with “young men … of the lower class.”  One of the 
more interesting charges was for “dancing and drinking with sailors in low houses.”38  Many 
other members of the corps, such as Commodore John Rodgers – one of the most senior officers 
who can be considered one of “Preble’s Boys” – shared Campbell’s emphasis on protecting the 
exalted nature of officership.  Commodore William Bainbridge, a distinguished veteran of the 
Barbary War, Quasi-War, and War of 1812, is even believed to have remarked that “I don’t 
allow a sailor to speak to me at all.”39 
The deference system contained an inherent disrespect for enlisted men.  The basic principle 
was written in Navy regulations and enshrined in naval tradition.  As gentlemen, officers were 
not allowed to be physically struck, as this would be an insult to their honor.  The enlisted men, 
however, had no such protection, as their lack of personal honor entitled them to no special 
respect.40  In the words of one officer, “I believe there never was so depraved a set of mortals as 
sailors are…. [Without discipline] they constitute a perfect rabble.”41  The officers passed this 
system down to their juniors: in a letter to a midshipman under his command in 1810, 
Revolutionary War veteran Commodore Thomas Tingey advised: “Never strike an [enlisted] 
offender yourself, it being degrading to an officer to do so.”42  This statement is incredibly 
revealing, because Tingey implies that flogging was not degrading to an enlisted man, it was 
degrading to an officer! 
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Some officers did not share Tingey’s position, however.  Especially in his younger days, 
Captain William Bainbridge frequently beat sailors with his bare fists, and on one occasion, 
reportedly struck a drunken sailor on the head with a sword while he was shackled, fracturing his 
skull and sending him into convulsions.  He then ordered the man flogged on deck.43  Although 
Bainbridge’s actions were especially harsh, abusive behavior was not rare in the Navy.  During a 
battle in the Quasi-War, a lieutenant drew his saber and deliberately killed an American sailor 
fleeing his gun in fear.44  Other officers beat sailors for offenses such as not showing enough 
deference to an officer, not obeying orders quickly or enthusiastically enough, or purely out of 
spite.  The manner in which enlisted men could be beaten was prescribed by regulations, but 
officers were rarely charged for abuse.  Between 1794 and 1815, only two officers were 
dismissed exclusively for such conduct, and both cases were under the most extreme 
circumstances.  Only when an officer had gone so far as to abandon his duty because of his 
inability to control his rage, executed the punishment himself with bare fist or instruments other 
than the officially sanctioned “cat o’ nine-tails”, and had previously committed similar offenses 
was an officer actually expelled. McKee argues that “the corps was unwilling to allow many 
prosecutions for such behavior, lest such prosecutions undermine the basis of its own 
authority.”45 
Officers, on the other hand, who drew their authority from their elevated rights as gentlemen, 
could not be struck under virtually any circumstances.  The maximum punishment for an officer 
striking an enlisted man was dismissal from the Navy (and this outcome was highly uncommon); 
if an enlisted man struck an officer, the Act for Better Government of the Navy authorized his 
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execution.46  This law was passed by Congress, meaning that the American public (or at least 
their generally wealthy representatives) approved and actively entrenched the system of 
deference in the Navy.  Even officers, however, were not allowed to beat other officers.  In 
separate incidents, two lieutenants were dismissed during the Quasi-War for striking 
midshipmen.47 
 
Seniority in the Officer Corps 
Seniority, a principle closely related to deference, governed the hierarchy within the officer 
corps.  Seniority was a major source of honor: it conveyed upon an officer the right to lead and to 
receive deference from his subordinates.  Especially in the earlier years of the Navy in the Quasi- 
and First Barbary Wars, the service relied heavily on this system even though it tended to 
produce too many incompetent commanders.48  One clear example of this strategy was the 
appointment of senior officer Commodore Samuel Barron to replace the more successful 
Commodore Edward Preble as commander of the Mediterranean Squadron in the First Barbary 
War.49  Because of the supreme importance that the Navy placed on seniority, many early 
captains resigned or refused commissions because they were displeased with their relative 
position on the list.  Revolutionary War hero Joshua Barney turned down a captain’s commission 
because he refused to be junior to Captain Silas Talbot.  Then when President John Adams 
decided that Talbot had seniority over Captain Thomas Truxton, Truxton resigned.50  In his letter 
                                                           
46
 Ibid., 235. 
47
 Ibid., 436. 
48
 Charles Benedict Davenport and Mary Theresa Scudder, Naval officers: their heredity and development 
(Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1919), 1. 
49
 Toll, Six Frigates, 225,260.  Samuel was the elder brother of Commodore James Barron – although unlike his 
brother, Samuel is too old to truly be considered a member of the first generation of officers to come up through the 
ranks of the Navy. 
50
 Stevens, An Affair of Honor, 18; Toll, Six Frigates, 129. 
20 
of resignation, he remarked that, “it as little becomes my character to yield my rank … as it 
would my Ship to an enemy unequal in force.  I have therefore thought it proper to quit.”51 
Beginning with the First Barbary War, however, the Navy began a slight shift in policy, 
occasionally giving promotions and appointments based partly on success in battle.  The 
seniority system was still dominant, but its hold was not as absolute, and rare instances of merit-
based advancement existed.  This change made some officers feel slighted, and offended their 
sense of honor.  The most radical example of these changes was the promotion of Lieutenant 
Stephen Decatur to captain in 1804 after his brave raid in the First Barbary War, when he 
destroyed the captured American frigate Philadelphia. This was a two-rung promotion, skipping 
the rank of master-commandant entirely, and making the 25-year old Decatur the youngest 
captain in the history of the US Navy to date.  Not surprisingly, some of officers passed over by 
this promotion were unhappy.  One such officer, Lieutenant Andrew Sterrett, resigned explaining 
in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy that, “it is impossible to be reconciled to the promotion of 
a junior officer over me, nor is it compatible with the correct principles of honor to serve under 
him.”52   
An example of the reduced weight of seniority between captains can be seen in a dispute 
between Captains Isaac Hull and William Bainbridge for control of the Boston Navy Yard.  In 
the Second Barbary War, Bainbridge was given command of the Mediterranean Squadron with 
the mission of ending the resurgence of piracy on the coast of North Africa. Hull – who had a 
more recent captain’s commission – relieved him of command of the Navy Yard in Boston.  In 
1815, Bainbridge returned to Boston in a fit of jealousy after sailing to the Mediterranean only to 
find out that Commodore Stephen Decatur had already secured peace treaties with Algiers, 
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Tunis, and Tripoli.53 Bainbridge wanted to reassume his lucrative post at the Navy Yard, but Hull 
refused to give it up.  Bainbridge appealed to the Secretary of the Navy, who also turned him 
down, instead appointing him “commander afloat.”  Angry that he had been deprived of a 
position he considered rightfully his, he wrote the Secretary that “Captain Hull and myself 
cannot be on friendly terms.  It is therefore necessary for the good of the service that the Navy 
Department explicitly defines the extent of my command, and authority on this station as Senior 
Officer.  I require nothing but what my seniority entitles me.”54  Although it is not explicitly 
stated, Bainbridge’s sense of personal honor is implied in the last line.  The fact that he required 
everything to which his seniority “entitles” him, demonstrates that he believed that he possessed 
an inherent right to have authority over Hull, who was inferior to him only in the date of his 
commission. 
This hypersensitivity to status – whether for the purpose of maintaining discipline or 
obtaining the privileges of rank vis-à-vis the other officers – characterized much of the officer 
corps, and caused problems amongst Preble’s Boy and between their generation and their junior 
officers.  The officers’ sense of honor, therefore, usually functioned less a source of order and 
stability (as intended), but more as a source of division.
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Chapter II: Collective Honor 
 
The originally feudal value of personal honor was central to the officer corps of the early 
Navy, but as an institution of the new American government, the corps was also heavily 
influenced by the ideas of the Revolution and Enlightenment.  In particular, the collective 
concepts of national honor and the honor of the naval service were integral parts of the ideology 
of Preble’s Boys.  When many members of the group became famous, these concepts shaped the 
way they sought to enhance their reputation.  The impact of this ideology on the cohesion of the 
corps was especially obvious during peacetime, when heightened competition between the 
officers forced confrontations. 
 
Nations and Honor 
The modern notion of “national honor” was formed after the Enlightenment.  It developed 
from the new concept of the “nation-state” and from the traditional value of personal honor that 
was still so prominent in Western society.  The “nation” did not emerge everywhere in Europe at 
the same time, but by the end of Napoleon’s campaigns, the whole continent had been exposed to 
this revolutionary idea.  It brought with it a new vocabulary and way of thinking regarding the 
state, replacing some of the established traditions of governance and blending with others.  In 
this new school of thought, states were no longer the personal possessions of kings; the citizens 
collectively formed a “nation,” which held the welfare of the state in trust.  In these “nation-
states,” citizens felt a greater interest in their state since they had a say in its governance.1 
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Traditionally matters of a state’s reputation such as military glory or breaches of sovereignty 
reflected on the monarch’s personal honor.  Without a monarchy, however, citizens applied the 
ancient concept of personal honor to the new owner of the state: the nation.  According to this 
method of thinking, national honor was a source of legitimacy for states as personal honor was 
for men, and it was held in public trust by the citizens just like the state itself.  Furthermore, a 
nation’s honor could be insulted in the same way a man’s honor could if its nation’s citizens, 
officials, or symbols were not treated with proper respect.  As with personal honor, when 
diplomacy failed, states resolved affronts to national honor with combat (usually in the form of 
military action), which demonstrated the nation’s courage and willingness to defend its rights. 
As one of the first countries to throw off the rule of a monarchy, the United States was also 
one of the first nations to apply this new political theory. It was in some ways an experiment, 
which made its future seem doubtful.  People in America and around the world questioned 
whether a country could even function effectively without a monarchy.2  In this especially 
formative period of America’s relations with the rest of the world, the extent to which the US 
stood up for its national honor would set the precedent of how seriously the nation would be 
treated.  Many Americans felt a sense of paranoia that the country would fall under the influence 
of the European powers or drift internally towards monarchical government, so a heightened 
sensitivity towards foreign insults to the national honor lasted even beyond the War of 1812.  In 
an 1835 sermon criticizing the misdirected American attitudes towards national honor, renowned 
Unitarian preacher Dr. William Ellery Channing argued that “many imagine that the honor of a 
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nation consists peculiarly in the spirit which repels injury, in sensibility to wrongs, and is 
therefore peculiarly committed to the keeping of the sword.”3  Channing highlights the influence 
of the country’s preoccupation with national honor that lasted well beyond the period of Preble’s 
Boys. 
 
Guarding America’s Honor at Sea 
There were many concrete causes for America’s focus on defending national honor in the 
Early Republic. In violation of the 1783 treaty of Paris, for example, the British did not 
immediately withdraw their troops from frontier forts in the Midwest.4  For the most part, 
however, the US was shielded from breaches of its sovereignty by the Atlantic Ocean.  
Consequently, the majority of infringements to national sovereignty took place at sea, where 
American citizens and trade came into direct contact with foreign militaries. Because of the 
perceived need of Americans to protect their national rights abroad, government leaders in 
Congress and the cabinet established the Navy for the purpose of defending the honor and 
interests of the United States. 
The first major crisis of national honor – and catalyst for the formation of the navy – was the 
Barbary conflict.  In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the autonomous Ottoman 
regencies of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli in North Africa sponsored large corsair fleets 
that raided Mediterranean shipping.  The rulers of these Barbary States demanded tribute from 
the countries that traded in the region in exchange for protection from the pirates.  Although 
European powers such as Britain could have almost certainly defeated the pirates, the states with 
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enough naval forces to do so allowed the system to continue in order to impair their less 
powerful rivals, who could not pay the tribute and were therefore subject to attacks and higher 
insurance premiums for shipping.5  Not surprisingly, the trouble for the United States began after 
the Revolutionary War, when American shipping was no longer under the protection of Great 
Britain.  By the mid 1780s, the Barbary States had begun seizing US merchant vessels, selling 
the crews into slavery, and demanding enormous sums (hundreds of thousands of dollars, in the 
case of Algiers) to cease their attacks.6 
Many Americans viewed the problem of the Barbary pirates in terms of national honor, and 
consequently as a justification for a military force to ensure that America received the respect 
due to a sovereign nation.  The raids denied the United States its right to travel the open seas 
freely and humiliated its citizens by selling them into slavery.  If these insults could not be 
punished, then, in the eyes of many Americans, the United States would appear weak to 
Europeans and its rights would seem unworthy of respect.  Several prominent examples of the 
concern that many Americans held of defending national honor vis-à-vis the Barbary States can 
be seen in the dialogue between political leaders.  For instance, while serving as minister to 
France, Thomas Jefferson wrote to John Adams advocating the use of military force to ensure 
US security in the Mediterranean, in part because “honor favors it…. It will procure us respect in 
Europe, and respect is a safe guard to interest.”7  Despite the opinions of influential leaders like 
Jefferson, the weak government of the Articles of Confederation could do little to address the 
problem.  However, when the dey of Algiers assembled a fleet of corsairs specifically for raiding 
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US commerce in 1793, the need to defend American sovereignty returned to prominence under 
the constitutional government.8  
As the Algerine corsair fleet began cruising for US shipping, the American merchant marine 
faced threats on another front.  Revolutionary France declared war on Austria and Prussia in 
1792, and the war quickly expanded to include Britain and the Dutch Republic. The United 
States’ neutral stance and lack of naval defenses subjected the American merchant marine to 
harassment by both the French and British.9  With America’s rights to free travel and trade under 
attack on three fronts, the government began serious debates about founding a Navy.   
On March 27, 1794, George Washington signed “an Act to Provide a Naval Armament” into 
law, establishing the US Navy. 10  Like Jefferson, who would later champion downsizing the 
seagoing navy in favor of gunboat flotillas for coastal defense, Washington was generally an 
isolationist who believed that foreign involvement or colonial ventures should be avoided.11  
However, he recognized that a navy would be necessary to defend American rights abroad, 
because the United States’ relative status in the world depended upon its ability to enforce 
breaches of its sovereignty overseas.  In a 1796 address to Congress, he explained that: “to 
secure respect for a neutral flag requires a naval force organized and ready to vindicate it from 
insult or aggression.”12  Although not all Americans shared Washington’s opinion on the need 
for a navy (many Republicans felt it would be too expensive or would lead to foreign 
entanglements), Congress voted in favor of the bill partly because citizens felt a sense of 
impotence at the insults levied upon the US.13   
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The first frigates were not ready to put to sea until 1798, but the threats posed by the Barbary 
States and the Napoleonic wars did not end until 1815, when Napoleon was defeated and the 
final treaties between the US and the North African regimes were signed.14  Throughout the 
period, the national honor and the Navy’s role as keeper of that honor were prominent in public 
dialogue.  In spring 1798, as war with France seemed imminent, Chief Naval Constructor Joshua 
Humphreys hosted a banquet (which was attended by President Adams) to celebrate the 
outfitting of the frigate United States.  Humphreys was a renowned naval architect who had 
designed five of the original six Navy frigates including the United States.  As his ship’s first war 
drew near, he toasted “the infant navy of the United States – Like the Infant Hercules, may it 
even in its cradle strangle the serpents which would poison American glory.”15  After war had 
broken out a few months later, Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert issued a circular to the 
American naval captains ordering them to challenge foreign “outrage on the honor of the 
American flag.”16 
As would become a common theme, this “Quasi-War” with France was caused by 
Americans’ anger that their sovereign right to neutrality was not being respected.  The same 
basic concept was voiced by leaders during the events surrounding the First Barbary War and the 
War of 1812.  In April 1804, Jefferson again commented on the enslavement of American sailors 
(this time from the captured naval frigate Philadelphia) in a letter to Navy Secretary Robert 
Smith, saying that unless the United States was able to recover the captives itself – without the 
help of any European powers – “our honor [will be] prostrated.”17 After the First Barbary War, 
the United Kingdom began to offend American sentiments.  The Jay treaty had secured an 
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uneasy peace between the US and Britain in 1796, but was a principal cause of the 1798 war 
with France.  However, when America made peace with France and resumed normal trade, 
relations with Great Britain again declined.  In 1805 and 1807, the British government placed a 
series of restrictions on American trade with France and its colonies, and enforced the new 
policies with the Royal Navy.18  In addition to this, the Royal Navy was so desperate for 
manpower that they began impressing sailors from American merchant ships.  Although – in 
theory – only British subjects were impressed, the offensive nature of the practice and abuses of 
this system by British officers caused public discontent in America.19  In the face of so many 
offenses, many political leaders considered the national honor so insulted by 1811 and 1812 that 
they considered the country honor-bound to go to war.  Congressman Peter B. Porter of New 
York, for example, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Relations, remarked that “the 
great body of the people … know that there is no honorable course for this country to pursue but 
open & determined resistance to British wrongs,”20 and Senator George Washington Campbell of 
Tennessee told a colleague that unless the UK changed its policies, “there appears at present no 
honorable ground upon which, war can be avoided.”21   
Perhaps the most significant single event in rousing the American public’s sense of outrage 
against Britain was the Chesapeake-Leopard affair.  The incident occurred several years before 
the War of 1812 when the British heavy frigate Leopard received an order from Vice Admiral 
Sir George Berkley to search ships leaving Hampton Roads, Virginia for British deserters.  On 
June 22, 1807, the Leopard hailed the US Navy frigate Chesapeake, under the command of 
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Commodore James Barron (the same captain who had become involved in an honor dispute with 
John Rodgers in the Barbary War), and requested that Barron assemble his sailors so that the 
British could search for the deserters.  When Barron refused to comply, the Leopard fired three 
broadsides into the Chesapeake, killing four sailors and wounding eighteen.  The ship was 
unprepared for combat, and Barron was forced to strike his colors.  He offered his ship as a prize 
to the British captain, but it was refused.  Instead, the captain removed four British deserters 
from the crew and sailed away.22 
British impressments, while not new, were virtually never carried out on American 
warships.23  It was seen as too great a disrespect to the American navy, and the US ship would be 
expected to defend itself (which Barron had attempted to do, but completely failed because the 
Chesapeake was unprepared).  Actually firing upon a neutral warship under these circumstances 
was unheard of, and the American public was furious.  The Norfolk Gazette and Public Ledger 
wrote that “we look upon it as degrading beneath contempt if we are to submit to such an 
insult.”24 This indignant reaction was widespread at the time.  Historian Robert Cray expands on 
the public’s response: “Americans treated [the incident] as a national insult, an affront to 
sovereignty perpetrated by an odious Great Britain unwilling to accord them the rights of a free 
and independent country.  Not surprisingly, nationalism spread across the country.”25 
This perceived offense that unified many Americans in 1807 remained highly influential in 
American politics throughout the period leading up to the War of 1812.  Three years later, in his 
orders to Captain John Rodgers, Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton reminded Rodgers that: 
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You, like every other patriotic American, have observed and deeply feel the injuries 
and insults heaped on our Country by the two great belligerents of Europe…. 
Amongst these stands most conspicuous the inhuman and dastardly attack on our 
Frigate the Chesapeake – an outrage which prostrated the flag of our Country…. It is 
therefore our duty … to vindicate the injured honour of our Navy, and revive the 
drooping Spirit of the Nation.26 
 
Hamilton’s order captures the feelings of society towards the breaches of American sovereignty 
that occurred in the period before the War of 1812. The Navy’s purpose, under these 
circumstances, was to protect and avenge the national honor from insults by Britain, France, and 
the Barbary States.  Hamilton was also right to highlight the significance of the Chesapeake-
Leopard affair to the officer corps.  The incident had lasting influence on the meaning of “honor” 
to the first generation of American naval officers, and the origin of at least two courts-of inquiry, 
a court-martial, and six duels – extending to 1821– can be traced to the shame and dishonor that 
surrounded the officers involved in the incident.27 
 
A Governing Principle of the Officer Corps 
Because defending national honor was one of the main purposes for the establishment of the 
Navy, it held central importance to Preble’s Boys.  The public was watching them, and in a 
country that typically favored isolationism and feared the tyranny of a powerful central 
government, the Navy’s continued existence depended on the officer’s ability to protect the 
American flag.  Jefferson had dramatically downsized the Navy in 1801 and 1806, and sought to 
prevent the construction of new, line-of-battle ships in favor of gunboat flotillas.28  Throughout 
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this period, officers feared that Congress might determine that the Navy was unnecessary 
entirely, or that it might be “mutilated” (many officers considered the shift to gunboats as such a 
disfigurement).29  After the war, however, when the service had proved itself with a string of 
victories in single-ship actions against the most powerful navy in the world, the American people 
were satisfied that the Navy was capable of fulfilling its duty to defend the nation’s respect from 
foreign offenses, and officers could generally be secure in the knowledge that the Navy would 
continue. 
The fact that the insults of foreign powers prior to 1815 placed the officers in the public eye 
is readily apparent.  The Chesapeake affair was one of the most prominent events to do this.  
Cray explains that “the Chesapeake tragedy subjected the American Navy in general … to 
official and popular scrutiny…. Sailors came to occupy a symbolic niche within a charged 
political atmosphere where national honor had been compromised.”30  The plethora of toasts, 
banquets, parades, songs, poems, and other writings dedicated to the officers from the Quasi-War 
through the War of 1812 also serve as evidence that the public was following the Navy and its 
officers.31  Newspapers were the most common means of recounting their exploits to American 
Society.  Even years after their glorious victories, they were still remembered as celebrities. An 
1819 article from the National Intelligencer refers to Commodores Rodgers, Bainbridge, and 
Chauncey as men whose “character needs not our praise.”32  The Intelligencer did not need to 
praise these commodores (or most other commodores, for that matter) because they had so often 
appeared in the newspapers throughout their careers. 
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In this period of especially high public sensitivity towards national honor, the senior officers 
also strongly believed in the need to defend America’s respect abroad.  When Congress agreed to 
pay a ransom to the ruler of Tripoli as part of the agreement ending the first Barbary war, 
Commodore Edward Preble wrote in a private letter that the treaty was a “sacrifice of national 
honor.”33 As these leaders began to train the first generation of officers, they sought to instill 
these values in their subordinates (perhaps because they sensed the increased public scrutiny of 
naval affairs).  In a letter to the midshipman under his command, for example, Commodore 
Thomas Truxton – a Revolutionary War privateer and one of the original six captains appointed 
to the Navy in 1794 – mentioned that “maintaining the honor of the national flag” was the 
Navy’s purpose.34 
Their actions and writings demonstrate that, as a group, “Preble’s Boys” took their mission of 
defending national honor to heart.  One such illustration occurred in October 1800 during 
Captain William Bainbridge’s visit to Algiers.  The newly promoted Bainbridge made the 
unfortunate mistake of anchoring the George Washington within range of the port’s shore 
batteries.  After fulfilling his mission of delivering tribute money to the US consul in the city, the 
dey demanded that Bainbridge transport the Algerine ambassador to Istanbul.35  In spite of 
Bainbridge’s protests that his orders prevented his compliance, the dey proclaimed that “You 
[The United States] pay me tribute, by which you become my slaves, I have, therefore, a right to 
order you as I may think proper.”36  When the dey then threatened to fire on his ship, Bainbridge 
was forced to consent.  To add insult to injury, the dey insisted that the Algerine flag be flown 
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from the George Washington’s mainmast. Bainbridge completed the journey to the Ottoman 
capitol, but replaced the Algerine flag with the American as soon as he was out of range of the 
shore batteries.  His letter of explanation to the Navy Department was primarily an attempt to 
defend his actions, but it carries undertones of how insulted and impotent he felt, and his anger at 
the disrespect shown to America.  He explains to his superiors that “I hope I may never again be 
sent to Algiers with tribute, unless I am authorized to deliver it from the mouth of our cannon.”37  
The drama surrounding the flags also demonstrates Bainbridge’s efforts to preserve the dignity 
of the United States before the rest of the world. 
The compulsion that the officers felt towards preserving America’s honor was still more 
visible in the reactions to the Chesapeake affair.  The officer’s need to protect the nation’s 
reputation became clear even during the fight.  In the ship’s ill-prepared state, it was unable to 
fight back at all because the loggerheads used to fire the cannons were not heated.  As the 
Leopard poured shot into the Chesapeake, James Barron begged of his junior officers: “for 
God’s sake, fire one gun for the honour of the flag.  I mean to strike.”38  In response, Lieutenant 
William Allen took a hot coal from the galley and used it to fire a single shot, and Barron 
ordered that the Chesapeake strike its colors.  After Barron was relieved of his post, Stephen 
Decatur was given command of the ship.  The need to atone for the dishonor of the Chesapeake 
was explicit.  He issued a highly unorthodox order that the ship would not fire or return salutes, 
because “a ship without honor can render none.”39  In fact, Preble’s Boys never fully escaped the 
shadow of the Chesapeake incident.  Several years later, while commanding the frigate President 
in 1810, Bainbridge told his crew that if the ship went into action “he would never surrender 
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while life remained … [and] never strike … [but] sink alongside.”40  This piece of rhetoric was 
given in peacetime when no combat could be reasonably expected.  Instead, Bainbridge was 
almost certainly thinking of the dishonor of the Chesapeake.  The remarks by Bainbridge, 
Decatur, and Barron demonstrate the captains’ recognition that maintaining the respect of the 
United States was an officer’s near-sacred duty. Barron and Bainbridge specifically highlight 
that a central part of this duty was bravely resisting offenses.  As both of their comments 
illustrate, their actions did not even need to be successful; the mere effort of fighting back 
protected America’s honor. 
 
An Honorable Service 
It is also important to note that in the eyes of the officers, the Navy’s honor reflected 
the national honor.  Protecting the reputation of the Navy, therefore, was also seen as part 
of an officer’s duty.  The previously mentioned letter by Secretary Paul Hamilton, for 
example, instructed John Rodgers to “vindicate the injured honour of our Navy” after the 
Chesapeake-Leopard affair.41  The matter of the service’s honor, is also especially 
obvious in the aftermath of the Chesapeake incident; Captain James Barron had been 
court-martialed and suspended from the Navy, and was forced to spend time as a 
merchant captain in Europe to support his family.  When he returned to the country after 
the War of 1812 to resume his commission, Commodore Stephen Decatur actively 
campaigned against his reassignment.  In a later letter to Barron, Decatur explained that 
he believed Barron had not fulfilled his duties to the Navy and country by not coming 
back from Europe during a time of war, and that that keeping Barron out of the service 
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was his responsibility as an officer: “I conceive that I was performing a duty I owe to the 
service; that I was contributing to the preservation of its respectability.”42 Although 
Barron countered this letter with a scathing response and defense of his conduct, even he 
did not dispute that protecting the Navy’s honor was an officer’s duty.43 
 
Two Honors Merge 
As stated, one of the key tenets of personal honor was integrity, which often equated with the 
fulfillment of duty.  Because the officers believed that courageously defending their collective 
honor was their duty, collective honor became a component of personal honor.  In one example 
of this during the Quasi-War, A group of four lieutenants and midshipmen wrote to the editor of 
the Commercial Advertiser, who had published an allegedly inaccurate account of the routine 
operations of their captain, John W. Leonard.  They explained that: 
As we have the honour of holding commissions under Capt. Leonard … we conceive 
it a duty we owe him as our commander, our country in whose service we are 
engaged, and ourselves, to declare that the abovementioned reports are false, and 
scandalous fictions, which must have proceeded from … an intention of derogating 
from Capt. Leonard’s conduct, courage and character, as an officer, and to throw the 
infant navy of our country into contempt and disrepute.44   
 
The officer’s response highlights how, in the mind of these officers, the duty to their country is, 
in part, to defend the reputation of the “infant navy.”  
William Bainbridge provides another example the fusion of personal and national honor in 
the ideology of the corps.  After his embarrassing incident with the dey of Algiers, Bainbridge 
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returned to the Mediterranean during the First Barbary War in command of the frigate 
Philadelphia in 1803.  On October 31, the Philadelphia ran aground on a reef off the coast of 
Tripoli, and corsairs quickly overwhelmed the ship and captured the crew.45  Naval historian Ian 
Toll argues that after the shame of losing his ship and the capture of his crew, Bainbridge was 
“borderline suicidal,” because he believed that when the word of the incident reached America, 
“he would be condemned as incompetent, perhaps even a coward.”46  Bainbridge wrote a letter to 
his wife in which he confided that “it would have been a merciful dispensation of Providence if 
my head had been shot off by the enemy, while our vessel lay rolling on the rocks.”47  
Preferring death to dishonor was a common motif in the naval service.  After the Chesapeake 
affair, Lieutenant Allen – the officer who had fired the ship’s only cannon shot – eloquently 
described the personal shame that accompanied the defeat in similar terms as Bainbridge: 
Oh! that some of their murderous balls had deprived me of the power of 
recollection the moment our colors were struck – I could have greeted it, received 
it to my bosom, with a kindred smile – nothing could equal so horrible as scene 
… [to hear the cries of the wounded] without the means of avenging them…. My 
country’s flag disgraced.  You cannot appreciate, you cannot conceive of my 
feeling at this moment … to be so mortified, humbled – cut to the soul.  Yes, to 
have the finger of scorn pointing me out as one of the Chesapeake.48   
The personal response that Allen felt was shared by much of the officer corps (although usually 
with less intensity).  As Robert Cray explains, “the attack upon the Chesapeake especially 
angered naval officers.  Distressed by the Chesapeake’s swift surrender, they took the matter 
deeply to heart; it was not something they could easily forget – their honor had been 
compromised, the navy disgraced.  For them, as for many Americans, redress was paramount.”49  
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Reputation and Status 
Because honor depended greatly on a gentleman’s reputation, the officers who stayed in the 
Navy long enough to become captains were often preoccupied with their public perception.  An 
officers’ fame (or infamy) tended to wax or wane depending on his ability to protect national 
honor through bravery and integrity;50 Cray describes how “the men aboard these vessels might 
receive praise or condemnation: the heralded inspired poetry, songs, and toasts, the despised 
court-martials and ignominy.”51  This fact made rumors and allegations against these officers 
seem more devastating than they might otherwise.   
In one such instance during the early 1820s when a group of Commodore Isaac Hull’s 
subordinates accused him of corruption while he commanded the Boston Navy yard, Hull’s 
reputation was severely tarnished in the eyes of the people of Boston.  He remarked to his friend 
Commodore David Porter that “Public opinion” had turned against him.52  Because of the 
damage to his reputation that he felt powerless to address, his letters from this time sometimes 
contained the same tone of desperation as Allen’s and Bainbridge’s.  For example: “I am willing 
to make any sacrifice rather than suffer what I do now” and “Indeed, sometimes my spirits leave 
me and I am ready to give up.”53  Hull’s honor was eventually redeemed, but the notion that 
personal honor depended on an officer’s reputation with the public remained.  In June 1822, an 
editorial in the Intelligencer defending Hull asserted that “Captain Hull enjoys the undiminished 
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confidence of his fellow citizens … and of his government…. His fame is the property of his 
country, and his countrymen will not suffer him and them to be robbed of it.”54 
The officers’ focus on their reputations had a negative side effect in the early Navy. 
Advancement in the service was governed primarily through seniority – the officers with earlier 
commissions were typically promoted first.  However, promotion in the Navy was very slow-
paced in times of peace when there were fewer posts for senior officers, so officers became 
trapped in junior positions.55  The only ways to accelerate the promotion process were to 
distinguish oneself in battle (which was almost impossible in peacetime) or for a senior officer to 
be dismissed.  Consequently, the period after the War of 1812 was characterized by “petty 
quarrels” as one historian wrote, which often ended in duels or tribunals.56  In particular, 
lieutenants who could not earn promotions clung to their minor privileges such as their quarters 
and uniforms, and their rights as officers. 57  These perceived dignities sometimes brought them 
into conflict with their superiors.   
Although captains no longer technically needed a “promotion,” they competed in the same 
manner for lucrative posts and for greater public reputation (which usually also came from 
prestigious posts).  This mentality in the corps caused even the senior officers to develop 
ridiculous and puerile disputes.  One particular accolade that many officers desperately sought 
was the honorary title of “commodore.”  The title was not technically a rank, in that it conferred 
no increase of authority or pay, but was the highest title one could earn in the early Navy.  It also 
conveyed the right to fly a special “commodore’s pennant” – which was basically the extent of 
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the privileges that the position entailed.58  To become a commodore, an officer had to be a 
captain who was issued orders by the President or Secretary of the Navy to command of a 
squadron.59  
In the years after the War of 1812, some officers – either through a misunderstanding of the 
regulations or a desire for prestige – began calling themselves “commodores” unlawfully.  One 
such officer was Captain John Shaw.60  When he was assigned to the Boston Navy Yard 
(commanded by Captain Isaac Hull) in 1820, Shaw ignored Hull’s demands to remove his 
pennant, and his attempt to use his title to gain precedence over Hull is revealed by the 
condescending tone with which he addressed his senior.  He complained of Hull’s “interference 
with flag officers,” and remarked that:  
It is well known that stationary naval yard officers are adding yearly to the intrinsic 
value of their estates, while the case is quite the reverse with a commanding naval 
officer afloat…. Why … you have decided to oppose this grade, in my opinion, can 
emanate from no other motives but ambition, and a desire to deprive us of the 
emoluments, which … [commodores] are entitled to.61 
 
In response, Hull wrote Congress that unless the title was made an official rank or eliminated, 
“there will be as many affairs of honor [duels] as there are flags…. It will be impossible to 
prevent dueling and all sorts of quarrels unless rank … is better defined … than it is now.”62  The 
controversy seemed to end in spring 1821, when Naval Commissioner Commodore John 
Rodgers explicitly ordered Shaw to remove his pennant.63  Shaw replied to Hull with a sarcastic 
note that revealed his bitterness: 
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Allow me, Sir, to congratulate you on the signal victory you have laterally gained 
over the broad pendant [sic] which for several years has been flying from on board 
the Independence. 
The uneasiness and vexation it has so long occasioned to you is now happily removed 
and the Board of Commissioners will no doubt receive your warmest gratitude and 
the poor old flag, were it susceptible of feeling and capable of expression, would no 
doubt … have returned you its thanks for your kindness in being instrumental in its 
timely risque [sic] from destruction by the howling of the winds and pelting of winter 
storms.64 
 
Shaw’s discontent over the dispute lingered to cause further discord in the officer corps. 
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Chapter III: Naval Tribunals 
 
The tribunals of the early Navy were not a “justice system” in the way that US military 
justice functions today.  They were missing many of the institutions and ideals that embody a 
modern, developed legal structure.  Instead, the tribunals originated from ancient naval traditions 
and attempted to maintain order primarily by preserving honor-based status distinctions.  Their 
focus on honor is most obvious in their issuance of charges for “ungentlemanly conduct”, 
cowardice, and failure to show proper respect to status distinctions and privileges.  The tribunals’ 
public nature also affected their use.  The small size of the corps ensured that even the trials of 
junior officers would be known at least by the other officers, and captains especially sought to 
publicize proceedings in order to defend their character.  Therefore the tribunals became a 
symptom of the competition and hyperactive sense of dignity that characterized the early naval 
officer corps.    
There were two basic types of tribunals that investigated officers’ conduct at this period: 
courts-martial and courts of inquiry.  A court of inquiry held no judicial powers – it existed only 
to establish the facts surrounding an official mishap.  Because they could not render punishment, 
officers whose reputation was being attacked in the press or among their peers would sometimes 
request a court of inquiry to vindicate their name.  However, these courts were not without legal 
ramifications, because their findings could often provide the groundwork for the Navy 
Department to draw up court-martial charges, or for the Secretary of the Navy to dismiss the 
officer outright.1  Courts-martial, on the other hand, existed primarily for the purpose of 
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rendering judgment on an officer’s guilt.  They had a wide range of penalties, from private or 
public reprimand, to suspension of an officer from duty or pay, or discharge from the service.  
Although they sometimes followed a court of inquiry, courts-martial did not require inquiries 
unless significant facts needed to be investigated.  As with their counterparts, courts-martial were 
often convened to make a public statement more than as a matter of practice.  In reality, the vast 
majority of the 322 officers who were dismissed from the Navy prior to 1815 were sacked 
without trial by the Secretary of the Navy.  Only 27 were dismissed by a court-martial.2   
The fact that courts-martial were not necessary to remove an officer demonstrates that their 
implementation was a conscious choice of the Secretary.  Except in cases where the facts needed 
to be determined, the main reason that the Secretary would waive his right to personally 
administer justice – thereby sacrificing his control over the naval roster – was to make a public 
statement that could not be achieved through private dismissal.  An 1808 exchange of letters 
between Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith and Commodore John Rodgers supports this idea.  
That July, Rodgers complained that an older officer under his command, Sailing Master N.W. 
Craft, was keeping a prostitute on his gunboat in such an open manner that he was corrupting the 
youth and tarnishing the name of the service. Keeping prostitutes on gunboats was not as 
uncommon as one might suppose, and it was generally viewed as a minor problem when carried 
on discreetly.  But because Craft was too open about it, Rodgers considered his subordinate’s 
conduct “derogatory to the character of a gentleman.”  Smith agreed that the situation “cannot 
but command the approbation of every man who has any pretentions to the character of a 
gentleman,” and advised Rodgers that “it would be well, if practicable, to make an example of 
this man by the sentence of a court-martial.”3  Smith left the decision to Rodgers, who chose to 
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demand Craft’s resignation rather than arrest him because he was concerned that members of the 
court would be too sympathetic.  The other officers on the station were young, and Rodgers felt 
that they would not find Craft’s conduct offensive enough to warrant his dismissal. 
 
Problems with the Court-martial 
In recent history, the US military has sometimes acted as a tool for social change in America, 
but as the nation sought to reinvent itself as a beacon of Enlightenment after the Revolution, the 
Navy remained strongly committed to its ancient traditions.4 The Navy’s legal system barely 
evolved from the regulations set forth in the1800 Act for Better Government of the Navy over the 
course of its first half century.5  The initial regulations set forth by the Act were derived 
unashamedly from the rules of the Royal Navy, and justified by their timeless nature.  A century 
later, the Navy still asserted that “with the rise and fall of great maritime nations ... continuity 
remained [in naval law], because each relied upon its predecessor for its background and 
authority.”6  Whether or not it was actually continuous, naval “justice” was archaic and sorely 
underdeveloped in the United States.  For example, the early Navy did not have any of its own 
legal materials – it was forced to rely on materials from the Royal Navy.7  Furthermore, the Navy 
Judge Advocate General Corps did not come to exist until 1865, and the Navy had no 
professional lawyers to serve in any capacity in the courts.  When possible, the Navy or 
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defendant might hire a civilian attorney in courts-martial cases, but because trials were often 
carried out at sea or in remote areas it was not always possible to have a lawyer present at all.8  
The regulations required a certain number of officers of equal or senior grade be present at a 
trial, so courts-martial were often made up predominantly of captains and masters commandant.  
However, in the tiny Navy of the early 1800s, this regulation often forced the administration to 
place obviously impartial men in positions of judgment (or ignore these rules altogether).9 In the 
words of Historian James Snedeker, the “administration of naval justice was lamely and 
imperfectly conducted” almost until the Civil War.10  Furthermore, there were no juries, and 
appeals were only possible through personal solicitation of the President or Secretary of the 
Navy.  There were not even regulations guaranteeing the accused a right to counsel until 1832.11  
Another problematic irregularity was the ease with which the courts could be used by the 
officers to settle personal disputes.  A squadron or station commander was able to order tribunals 
for junior officers.12  If the Secretary of the Navy decided that an officer had acted unacceptably 
and a public example needed to be made of him, he could also order a court-martial.  Instead of 
using this ability, however, the Secretaries would usually convene a court only after receiving a 
request for a trial from other officers. The Navy Department took these complaints seriously 
(although seniority was highly influential in the process).  For example, in the previously 
mentioned decision as to whether or not Sailing Master Craft ought to be court-martialed, 
Secretary of the Navy Smith explained to Rodgers that “being on the spot and knowing all the 
circumstances, you can best judge…. I submit the whole to your discretion, and I will be 
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satisfied with whatever course you may take.”13  The weight that the secretaries gave the 
officers’ requests made the corps itself the de facto instigator of most tribunals, allowing the 
officers to use the trials as tools to defend their personal reputations, attack their rivals, or display 
their authority to the officers under their command.14 
 
The Chesapeake Tribunals 
The first high-profile instance in which the officers used courts as a means for protecting 
their reputation occurred in the aftermath of the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair.  Almost all of the 
junior officers on the Chesapeake felt so disgraced that they wrote a letter to Secretary of the 
Navy Robert Smith the day after the incident requesting Barron’s arrest and a court of inquiry.15  
The Secretary agreed, praising their candor, and the court of inquiry convened in fall 1807.16 One 
of the signers of the letter to Smith was the same Lieutenant Allen who lamented having the 
shame of “the finger of scorn pointing me out as one of the Chesapeake.”17  Allen became one of 
Barron’s chief antagonists in the proceedings.18 
From the beginning of the court hearings, his subordinates’ efforts to place the blame on 
Barron demonstrated that the purpose of the tribunals was to salvage their reputations from their 
public disgrace.  The proceedings were frequently conducted in terms of personal or national 
honor – particularly questioning Barron’s courage.  The court of inquiry, for example, found that 
Barron had surrendered prematurely and had “used language in the presence of his men 
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calculated to dispirit his Crew.”19  In light of the findings of the inquiry, President Jefferson 
ordered the Secretary of the Navy to convene a court-martial.  The court tried Commodore 
Barron, Master Commandant Charles Gordon (the ship’s flag captain – an officer who assisted a 
commodore with the command of his flagship), the captain of the Chesapeake’s marine 
detachment, and the ship’s gunner beginning in January 1808.20   
The resulting trial was hailed by some as “well-composed” and the first tribunal to “set the 
naval example of a rigid adherence to principles, forms and precepts.”21  However, the number of 
irregularities in the proceedings makes it almost impossible to believe that Barron received a fair 
trial.  The most glaring examples were the members of the court.  John Rodgers was chosen as 
president of the court only months after barely avoiding a duel with Barron, while Decatur 
explicitly admitted to having a preconceived opinion of Barron’s guilt.22 Several members of the 
board also seem to have admired Lieutenant Allen and openly discussed their intentions to attain 
a promotion for him.23  
In Barron’s final defense, he entreated the board: “My life [and] my honour … hang on your 
decision…. Of one blessing I can never be deprived, a mind free from self reproach, and 
unconscious of offence against the duties of my station or the honour of my country.”24 The 
court, however, was unmoved.  It found that Barron “failed to encourage in his own person, his 
inferior officers and men to fight courageously” (among other charges), and sentenced him “to be 
suspended from all command in the Navy of the United States; and this without any pay or 
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official emoluments of any kind, for the period and term of five years.”25 The verdict was 
especially bitter because several of the charges were very close to that of cowardice in defending 
the flag.26  Gordon and the marine captain, who clearly deserved some amount of blame for their 
responsibilities in preparing the ship for battle, were only sentenced to private reprimands, which 
were never carried out.27   
On the whole, the composition and conduct of the members of the court suggest that even 
after Barron’s subordinates had called for a trial as a tool to defend their reputations, the 
members may have used it as an opportunity to bolster or attack the reputations of Gordon, 
Allen, Barron, and the other officers involved in the Chesapeake affair based on the members’ 
personal feelings.  The disgrace that Barron faced from the trials was partly responsible for his 
later duel with Decatur, and may have played a role later in his career when he had the 
opportunity to serve on courts for those who had tried him. 
 
Defending Status 
Personnel of every rank appealed to legal proceedings to defend their status from both 
superiors and subordinates.  One of these numerous courts-martial occurred in the Mediterranean 
Squadron in 1817 between Captain Oliver Hazard Perry and Marine Captain John Heath.  
Heath’s work ethic was too laid-back for his zealous Captain Perry, which lead to frequent 
conflicts between the pair.  Perry considered Heath’s behavior insubordination, and therefore an 
insult to his honor.  In one review of Heath’s conduct, Perry wrote that “the general deportment 
of Captain Heath towards me, so contrary to the usual address of my officers … induced me to 
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believe that his conduct proceeded from a premeditated determination to insult me.”28  Heath 
nonetheless continued carrying out his duty in a relaxed manner.  The tension finally reached a 
boiling point in one skirmish with his subordinate in September 1816, in which Perry became so 
frustrated that he told Heath that he was a “damned rascal and a scoundrel and had not acted as a 
gentleman.”  Heath responded: “Captain Perry, you must recollect I have the feelings of a 
gentleman, I will have redress for this language.”  Perry’s self-control slipped even further, and 
Perry slapped Heath in the face and called him a “puppy.”29 
The two officers immediately demanded courts-martial proceedings against each other, 
which began in January.  Perry was charged with “ungentlemanly and unofficerlike conduct” for 
his abusive language. Interestingly, striking Heath was classified separately under the charge of 
“oppression and cruelty.”30  Enlisted men were commonly beaten, which demonstrates that 
Perry’s offense was considered cruel and oppressive because he had disrespected Heath’s 
immunity to corporal punishment – his privilege as an officer and gentleman.  Perry defended 
himself on the grounds that he was provoked by Heath’s “outrageous conduct” – implicitly 
stating that the authority as naval captain was more important than the privileges of a captain of 
marines, thereby justifying Perry’s abusive behavior.  Perry’s strongest charge against Heath was 
that of “disrespectful, insolent, and contemptuous conduct to me, his superior officer.”31 In his 
defense, Heath made a romantic appeal to the court:  
Show me the being in existence, who regards his honor and reputation, who would 
have acted with less appearance of resentment…. My character, which is dearer to me 
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than life, assaulted…. Can this be suffered?  Nature herself revolts at it…. The 
ground of honor is consecrated: it is impaled by barriers which the hand of tyranny 
must not invade.32 
 
Heath and Perry’s arguments demonstrate that the incident was a conflict of status and honor:  
Perry hit Heath because he felt his authority as captain was being challenged – and therefore his 
honor.  Heath, for his part, was indignant at being verbally and physically insulted in a manner 
that any gentleman would have found offensive, and that was explicitly unacceptable treatment 
for a naval officer.  The courts took the easy way out, convicting both of them, and sentencing 
them to reprimands.33 In the eyes of many junior officers serving in the Mediterranean Squadron, 
however, the court’s verdict for Perry was unacceptably light. 
Perry’s court had consisted of basically the same officers as Heath’s (except with fewer 
junior officers) and the Perry was a national hero for his role at the Battle of Lake Erie; 
consequently, many of the officers felt that Perry’s crime had been ignored because of his 
reputation and the fact the captains’ desire to extend their authority over their subordinates.34  
Heath published a pamphlet entitled Serious Charges against Captain Oliver H Perry, which 
criticized both Perry’s conduct and the members of the court.35Forty-one junior officers even 
petitioned the Senate for a Congressional inquiry into the court-martial.36  The petition, 
pamphlet, and the media attention that these “celebrated” trials received made these courts-
martial an especially public affair, enflaming this and other, less public disputes within the 
officer corps about junior officer privileges and captains’ authority.37  Most importantly, they 
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helped create an impression that junior officers’ rights were threatened, and demonstrated that 
the limits to their privileges were not settled. 
 
Preble’s Boys Requesting Their Own Inquiries 
As the Chesapeake and Perry/Heath trials demonstrated, tribunals could protect or damage 
officers’ reputations.  Their ability to redeem men’s honor caused some officers who felt their 
character was being questioned unfairly to ask the Secretary of the Navy to convene courts to 
clear their name.  Because of their public reputation and recurrent conflicts of honor, Preble’s 
Boys used this process frequently.  In February 1812, for example, Master Commandant Arthur 
Sinclair requested a court of inquiry after his ship nearly sank in a storm.  Lieutenant Walter 
Winter, another officer on the ship supposedly insulted Sinclair’s captain’s conduct after the 
incident, and Sinclair responded by asking for an inquiry to clear his name.  The Secretary 
approved the court, which found that “Lieutenant Walter Winter had no just cause to charge 
Master Commandant Arthur Sinclair with unofficerlike conduct.”38  Furthermore, as Christopher 
McKee observes, “close reading of the court’s opinion suggests that its members were not 
prepared to encourage the practice of disgruntled first lieutenants bringing charges against their 
commanding officers.”39  While this incident occurred several years before the Perry/Heath 
tribunals, it did occur in peacetime, and represents the focus in the Navy on protecting the 
reputations of senior officers from their subordinates. 
Although the practice was most common among the captains, the use of courts of inquiry to 
clear one’s reputation was also carried out by other officers.  These instances were much less 
common, because officers who did not have their own ships had much less of a public reputation.  
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Still, certain mature officers cared enough (and had enough clout with the Navy Department) to 
obtain such inquiries.  In one instance, a Navy surgeon named Thomas Harris appealed to the 
Secretary for a court of inquiry in 1818 after a dispute with William Barton, another surgeon.  
Harris had preferred charges against Barton earlier that year for allegedly stealing his post as 
surgeon at the naval hospital at Philadelphia, but Barton’s court-martial had accused Harris, as 
complainant, of “defamation of a brother officer,” a crime that “whether secret or open, must 
ever be productive of consequences highly prejudicial to the service, and destructive of that 
security which an officer ought to find in his profession, against calumny and unmerited 
allegation.”40  Harris’ inquiry was tasked with determining the truth of these allegations against 
Harris, and like Barton’s court-martial, Harris’s court also demonstrated the importance that the 
senior officers placed on maintaining officers’ reputations – particularly in the court findings, 
which were released to the public.  After clearing Harris of any blame, the court remarked that: 
The amount of injury which such charges are capable of producing, is generally 
commensurate to the publicity which is given to them, and to the respectability and standing 
in society of those by whom they are made.  The court will, therefore, close their 
proceedings, by respectfully recommending, that the opinion of this court may receive the 
same publicity which has been given to the sentence of the court martial complained of by 
Dr. Harris. 
 
The court further stated its belief that “the integrity of [our] profession” 41 depended upon the 
officer’s efforts to properly investigate accusations against their peers.  The results were 
published in the Niles Weekly Register.   
 
The Boston Navy Yard Tribunals 
The most prolonged and bitter series of tribunals occurred after several men who felt their 
privileges had been ignored came together against a common antagonist. As mentioned in 
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previous chapters, Captain Isaac Hull had made several enemies while commanding the Boston 
Navy Yard.  By refusing to relinquish his post at the yard to Commodore William Bainbridge 
after Bainbridge returned from the Mediterranean, Hull had angered his senior captain 
considerably.  Bainbridge was determined to unseat Hull from what he considered his rightful 
position.  Hull had also forced John Shaw, a slightly junior captain, to remove his illegitimate 
commodore’s pennant – an embarrassment to Shaw.42  Added to these, Hull was unable to 
adequately accommodate all of the demands of one of the lieutenants under his command, a man 
named Joel Abbot.43  These three officers of varying seniority worked together to undermine 
Hull’s authority with many of his civilian enemies – mostly merchants and businessmen who had 
lost contracts under Hull’s authority or had some other financial dispute. The group circulated 
rumors in the yard, city, and the Navy Department that Hull and several other key personnel in 
the Navy Yard administration were involved in a “chain of proceedings, more or less intricate” 
of embezzlement and fraud.44  Their attacks on Hull’s character were almost conspiratorial.  
Abbot attempted to orchestrate a network of perjury, while Bainbridge appears to have spied on 
Hull through his clerk.45   
To what extent these officers believed the accusations they made against Hull is unclear.  
From their testimonies, it seems possible that Abbot genuinely believed that Hull was guilty of 
all of their charges simply because, in their minds, if Hull was dishonorable enough to inflict 
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grievances upon them, then he was probably dishonorable in all his dealings.46  For Bainbridge’s 
part, it would not seem out of character if he had goaded Abbot and the others purely for the sake 
of damaging Hull’s reputation – especially as he was facing public attacks against his character 
because of his involvement in the Barron/Decatur duel.47  What is clear is that the discordant 
officers sought to discredit Hull’s honorable reputation by circulating rumors of their charges.  
After riling up the people of Boston, the officers asked the Secretary of the Navy for a court-
martial, citing the rumors “in circulation both in and outside of the Navy Yard” as a confirmation 
of their suspicions, and a reason why the charges could not be ignored.48  However, the tables 
were turned on Hull’s enemies when the Secretary dispatched the no-nonsense Commodore 
David Porter to investigate.  Porter promptly recognized that Abbot and his associates were 
malcontents, and that there was virtually no evidence to support their claims.  In a sarcastic letter 
to the Secretary of the Navy, Porter explained the accusations against Hull’s administration: 
Some it seems have got rich, no one can tell how … and putting together certain 
circumstances … there seems to have been produced a conviction of a regularly 
connected chain, formed for the purpose of defrauding the government, from the 
commandant … down to the workmen of the yard … with the exception only of the 
few officers who considered themselves fairly entitled to extra allowances for 
firewood, chamber money, etc., which was refused to them, and which they seem to 
have no doubt has gone into the pockets of these conspirators.49 
 
When Abbot was continually unable to provide any evidence, Porter ordered his arrest on 
February 5, 1822 and charged him with “wickedly and maliciously conspiring with others to 
defame the character of Captain Isaac Hull.” A week later, Hull placed Shaw under arrest on 
charges of “unofficerlike and ungentlemanlike conduct” for circulating rumors about him. 50  
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Bainbridge was not investigated, perhaps because of his seniority or his skill at operating within 
the parameters of acceptable conduct for an officer.   
As the two officers (Abbot in particular) became desperate in the face of an impending court-
martial, they even attempted to use scare tactics to force the officers loyal to Hull to support their 
charges.  One lieutenant received an anonymous letter that warned him:  
Beware!!! … Hull is not your friend. he affects to be, to accomplish his own purposes 
which once effected, your ruin is inevitable.  The moment he is honourable acquitted 
(should such be the case, which much I doubt) it is his intention to arrest you for 
having used disrespectful language in reference to him…. Think not that gratitude or 
justice will bind him; he knows not those feelings…. [You] were invited to dine with 
Mrs. Hull in consequence of … [the] things … going on.  Did you ever receive such a 
mark of her attention before?  and why not? were you less worthy formerly than 
now?51 
 
The letter was signed “a Spectator,” and even featured warnings in Latin, such as "Dat veniam 
corvis, vexat censura columbas.”52  In spite of their threats, Shaw and Abbot’s inability to 
provide strong witnesses to support their accusations caused their courts-martial to find them 
guilty.  Shaw was suspended for six months with pay, and Abbot for two years without pay, with 
Abbot’s sentence “publicly read, at each of the naval stations in the United States.”53 
Rather than putting an end to the challenges to Hull’s reputation, the trials and sentences 
made the situation worse.  The New England Galaxy, ran newspaper articles suggesting that 
Shaw’s sentence of “six months recreation at Nahant, Ballston, Niagara, and other fashionable 
places of resort, with no care upon his mind, and plenty of money in his pocket!” was so mild 
because he had been doing the Navy and the country a service.54  In a note published in the 
Galaxy, Abbot blamed his sentence on “the difficulties and dangers which surround a junior 
officer, who attempts to investigate the conduct of his superiors.”  In the months following the 
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trials further articles attacking Hull were published in other newspapers such as the Boston 
Patriot, and both men published accounts of their court proceedings with their commentary. 55 
Hull requested a court of inquiry “to put a stop to the abuse these people are heaping up 
against everyone that has stood in the way of their abominable designs.”56 Hull also explained 
that he believed he had a right to an inquiry: 
Conscious of my innocence as well as of the fidelity with which I have discharged my 
duty, it ought not to be required of me to remain a silent spectator…. I have always 
understood that it was the tacit if not express engagement of the government with its 
officer, that they should, of right, be entitled to an investigation of their conduct 
whenever it was made the subject of reproach.57 
 
The Secretary consented in July, and Captains John Rodgers, Isaac Chauncey, and Charles 
Morris who were appointed to conduct the tribunal pronounced him innocent of blame on 
October 15.  The Patriot, the Baltimore Morning Chronicle, and the National Intelligencer all 
ran an article that praised the “triumphant acquittal of that meritorious officer…. Bravery and 
valor become associated with stern probity … and radiant honor.”58  Perhaps more than any other 
instances in the early Navy, the Boston tribunals highlight the close relationship between court 
proceedings and public reputation that occurred most often over matters of officers’ privileges.  
The dramatic shift in public opinion on Hull before and after the tribunals reveal the power of 
courts of inquiry as a tool for influencing public opinion.  The friendship between Hull and both 
Porter and Rodgers is also worth noting, as it suggests that – as with the Chesapeake trials – the 
friendships and factions within the small corps of senior officers influenced the outcomes of 
tribunals. 
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Publicizing Proceedings 
After the War of 1812, when Preble’s Boys were at the height of their fame, Americans took 
an increased interest in the trials of their heroes.  Their private honor became a matter of public 
interest, and the findings of the courts could protect an officers’ reputation or confirm the 
harmful rumors circulating in the press.  The scandals further reflected on the honor of the 
officer crops and the service, and had the potential to influence Congress’ treatment of the Navy.  
Heath’s pamphlet criticizing Perry and his court-martial is one strong example.  Heath put 
forward his own account of the trial, which defended his reputation while challenging the honor 
of Captain Perry and the Navy before the public.  Niles Weekly Register editor Hezekiah Niles 
summed up the situation exceptionally well: 
It is a rule absolute with me not to admit any thing of a private or personal nature into 
the pages of the Weekly Register…. I have had the question under consideration … 
whether the contents of this pamphlet should be estimated as having a public or a 
private character…. It is impossible that we can easily give up the hero of Erie to a 
censure like this – or readily suppose that com. Chauncey [the squadron’s 
commodore] and the gallant officers of the squadron in the Mediterranean should 
become parties in it through an unjust partiality for capt. P. or a pusillanimous fear of 
his renown.  But so it is that in our opinion, this pamphlet demands a reply…. [The 
charges must] injure the service considerably, and tend to produce a re-action against 
the naval establishment.  Hence it is a public concern.59 
 
Niles’ article demonstrates why the officers were so concerned with their reputation: as 
public figures, their honor was a public concern.  If their honor was in doubt, it was doubted by 
American society, and it reflected on the naval service as well. 
Other officers also appealed to public opinion through the publication of the results of their 
tribunal or their full court proceedings as Isaac Hull had done.  When another one of Preble’s 
Boys, Captain Samuel Evans, was court-martialed on similar charges a few months after Hull, he 
too chose to publish the court’s findings in July 1823 with an attached note from Secretary of the 
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Navy Smith Thompson clarifying that he had not committed any crimes.60  And more than just 
court proceedings were being published: in 1822, David Porter published the second addition of 
his Journal of a Cruise made to the Pacific Ocean, which recounted in a favorable light his 
expedition in the Pacific during the War of 1812, partially for the purpose of refuting criticism 
published by a British reader.61 
The full proceedings of some trials, such as the Chesapeake and Perry/Heath trials, where the 
officers were censured for dishonorable behavior, were not published until years later when they 
were demanded by Congress.  The Navy did not publish the Perry/Heath trials until 1818 when 
Congress required their release as part of an unsuccessful effort to revise the Navy regulations.62  
The Chesapeake tribunals were not released until 1822 when they were published with 
Congressional support alongside another court of inquiry investigating Barron’s conduct after his 
suspension.63  One explanation for the delay in releasing these files to the public was that these 
documents were simply never intended for the public.  The Navy administration hoped to protect 
the service’s reputation by only releasing the charges and rulings to the public, rather than 
submitting the entirety of the proceedings to public scrutiny.64  
The number of tribunals certainly tarnished the Navy’s reputation in the late 1810s and early 
1820s, and the leadership was actively looking for a solution. In March 1821, Secretary of the 
Navy Thompson remarked that “the frequency of Courts martial, and courts of inquiry, is not 
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only expensive, but extremely injurious in many respects to the public service.”65  Thomas 
Macdonough’s brother-in-law wrote him in 1822 that the inordinate numbers of courts-martial 
“have ruined the credit of the army and the navy seems inclining to the same extravagance.”66  
Their concern was definitely warranted.  Besides the major trials already mentioned, Lieutenant 
Colonel Franklin Wharton, the commandant of the Marine Corps, was court-martialed in 1817, 
and James Barron had a second court of inquiry in May 1821.67   
 
The Kennon Court-martial and a “Better Remedy” 
The string of highly publicized trials in from 1820-1825 shook the public’s respect for the 
Navy and its captains.  The disputes were often worsened by the factions that developed between 
captains, and came to include some of the older lieutenants (who, not coincidently, were unable 
to advance unless existing captains left the Navy).68  The trials reached a peak in 1824 and 1825, 
when three more courts-martial forced a shift among the senior officers to determine the limits of 
a captain’s power and a junior officer’s privileges. 
The first of these courts-martial was that of Lieutenant Beverly Kennon in 1824.69  David 
Porter and Kennon were on bad terms following a cruise together in 1823, and when they 
returned to the US the two men published attacks against each other in the newspapers. 70 As a 
skilled writer (at least compared to some of his colleagues) Porter had a penchant for defending 
the reputations of his friends and himself in the papers.  He had written to newspapers the year 
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before, for example, to defend his friend Isaac Hull at the Boston Navy Yard.71 After these 
public exchanges, however, Porter arrested Kennon, charging that he “maliciously used base 
means for defaming my character.”72 
Kennon was acquitted, but the Navy Department realized that it could no longer tolerate the 
media circus created by the public appeals of its officers over personal disputes. In a letter to a 
Congressman from Virginia who requested that the proceedings be published, Secretary of the 
Navy Samuel Southard explained that: 
There are circumstances attending this case, which, in my opinion, render it indiscreet 
and improper for the Department to make the publication.  Much, perhaps all, of the 
difficulties in Lieut. Kennon’s case, arose from improper articles in the newspapers, 
which ought not to have been made by the parties, as officers…. There must, in some 
way, be a period put to the public altercations of our naval officers, in this as well as 
in other cases, unless we are disposed to break down both the discipline of the service 
and the affections of the nation for the navy.  There can be no period better for the 
purpose than the present; and, so far as [it] depends on this Department, it will now be 
done.  Orders have heretofore been given to prevent a resort to newspapers to exhibit 
charges, and injure each other’s reputation, and these orders will be rigidly enforced.  
If one officer be guilty of improper conduct towards another, or towards the public, 
there is a much easier and better remedy dictated, both by self respect and regard to 
the service.73 
 
The remedy that Southard referenced was the private tribunal – where rulings and sentences but 
not the actual events in question (or even the full court proceedings) would be made public.  
However, it took time to establish the tenet that the press was not an acceptable forum for 
officers to cite grievances or attack their peers.  The next major court-martial – possibly the most 
public since the Chesapeake affair – would help clarify the Secretary’s orders. 
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The Porter Trials and the Decline of Appeals to the Public 
Considering his history of defending his own and other’s reputations before the public, his 
disregard for orders, his semi-sacred rank of captain (which provided its owners with a degree of 
insulation from serious punishment), and his celebrated status as a war hero, perhaps it is not 
surprising that David Porter would refuse to respect the Secretary’s prohibition on appeals to the 
press.  The first charge of Porter’s court-martial – and the catalyst for the entire scandal – was 
based on his overzealous efforts to secure the honors that foreign officials were customarily 
required to render American officers.  The incident occurred in 1824 while Commodore Porter 
was commanding a squadron in the Caribbean to suppress piracy.  Lieutenant Platt, commanding 
the schooner Beagle, landed at the Spanish colonial village of Fajardo, Puerto Rico on naval 
business.  After an initially uneventful arrival, he was arrested “in the most insulting, most 
provoking, and most aggravating manner, that it is impossible to imagine,” as a suspected pirate 
by the colonial officials who refused to accept that he was an American naval officer.74  He was 
eventually released and reported the incident to Porter, who considered the Spanish officials’ 
behavior unacceptable.  Porter landed his armed sailors and marines at Fajardo on November 14, 
1824, “for the purpose of obtaining suitable redress, or an apology for the insult, that had been 
offered to the flag of the United States, in … [the] person [of Lieutenant Platt]…. A refusal of 
which would compel him to resort to arms, which should terminate in the final destruction of the 
village.”75   
Although the naval officers had a duty to defend the honor of the flag abroad, Porter went too 
far even for the Navy Department.  Although the colonial administrators apologized to Porter, his 
actions in invading and threatening the destruction of a neutral town caused a diplomatic crisis 
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with Spain.  The President ordered that Porter submit to a court of inquiry, which was followed 
by a court-martial.76 What truly condemned Porter, though, was his refusal to accept the 
reprimands of his superiors.  In an ill-conceived attempt to defend his reputation, he took to his 
pen.  He published a pamphlet defending his conduct and dedicated it to the President, who was 
in the process of examining the findings of the court of inquiry and determining if a court-martial 
was necessary.  Secretary of the Navy Southard wrote to Porter explaining that it was a “surprise, 
that you should have considered it proper, while your case and the report of the court of inquiry 
were still under the consideration of the Executive, to make a publication relating thereto, and 
especially a publication in so many respects deficient and inaccurate.”77 By publishing the 
pamphlet and writing to the President, Porter had gravely overestimated his privileges as a 
captain under review, and was charged again with “insubordinate conduct, and conduct 
unbecoming an officer” in addition to a charge for the Fajardo affair. 
Even Porter’s friends may have viewed the publications as unacceptable: a naval colleague of 
John Rodgers explained that “Comm. P— is thought to have been very indiscreet towards the 
Department, & for this he has lost friends.”78 Also, in a strange twist of fate, Commodore James 
Barron had finally been readmitted to active duty in the Navy a year before, and as one of the 
few available officers senior to Porter, he was assigned to preside over the case.79  Porter had 
served on the 1807 Chesapeake court-martial that suspended Barron from the service, and, as a 
master commandant (and therefore not technically allowed to be on a court for a senior officer), 
he had been the most active member of the board in questioning Barron and the other 
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witnesses.80 Whether Barron was biased will never fully be known, but his role as president of 
the tribunal serves as further evidence of the major problem in the Navy of finding enough 
unbiased members of the correct rank to fill a tribunal.81 
His first charge carried only one specification outlining the entire Fajardo scandal, even 
though it acknowledged that he committed “divers [sic] acts of hostility.”  The court of inquiry 
had been called specifically to determine the events at Fajardo, and its findings would typically 
have been used to spell out each individual specification of the charge.  The second charge, 
however, carried five distinct specifications: 
1) That he had written “a letter of an insubordinate and disrespectful character” to the 
President of the United States, and similar letters to the Secretary of the Navy 
2) That he had published a pamphlet of his court of inquiry proceedings “before the 
Executive had published, or authorized the publication of the proceedings” 
3) That his pamphlet incorrectly reported the proceedings 
4) That, in his pamphlet, he made “various remarks, statements, and insinuations … highly 
disrespectful to the Secretary of the Navy, and to the said court of inquiry” 
5) That, in his pamphlet, he made various official government correspondence public 
without permission82 
The fact that his second charge was spelled out so explicitly compared to the first charge reveals 
that this was the true offense for which Secretary of the Navy Southard sought to punish him.  If 
trials such as Perry’s can be relied upon as precedent, Porter’s distinguished career would almost 
certainly have prevented any major disciplinary repercussions.  The courts-martial of Samuel 
Evans and Charles Stewart (Stewart’s trial followed Porter’s almost immediately) also 
demonstrate this trend of courts-martial to overlook the questionable conduct of senior officers.  
But by openly and vigorously defying Southard’s orders to all officers to refrain from appealing 
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to the public to settle matters of reputation (orders that were directed at him in particular after the 
Kennon trial), Porter crossed a line that the administration and the other captains were not 
willing to overlook.  Although the court cited his “anxious disposition to maintain the honor and 
advance the interests of the nation and of the service” at Fajardo, he was found guilty of both 
charges, and sentenced to suspension for six months on August 10, 1825.83  Ultimately the 
disgrace of the court-martial’s sentence was too much for Porter to bear, and the officer who had 
been so fixated on the honor of the corps resigned from the US Navy.84 
 
The Stewart Court-martial: Consolidating the “Better Remedy” 
The final major trial of this period took place immediately after Porter’s trial, when 
Commodore Charles Stewart returned that year from his command of the Pacific Squadron.  He 
was accused of violating a Peruvian embargo, “cruelty and oppression,” and various other 
charges. As with Hull’s court of inquiry, the charges were mostly unfounded and came from the 
numerous enemies he had made in normal interactions.  The accusation of “cruelty and 
oppression” was brought by Lieutenant Joshua Sands, and represented a similar grievance to 
those of other junior officers of the time such as Abbot and Heath.  After Sands had attempted to 
leave the ship against orders for a duel while on their cruise, Stewart arrested him and kept him 
confined to his quarters for six months until Isaac Hull arrived to relieve Stewart with enough 
officers for a proper court-martial. 85 When they returned to the United States, a court-martial for 
Stewart was convened in August 18, 1825 – only a week after Porter’s sentence had been handed 
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down.  While the trial of the celebrated naval hero did not stay out of the press, Stewart made no 
publications himself.86   
The court found Stewart innocent of all charges.  The verdict was important for several 
reasons.  Where the Porter and Kennon courts-martial had ended the acceptability of appealing to 
the public to settle disputes, the ruling on the “cruelty and oppression” charge in Stewart’s court-
martial was part of a broader movement to establish the authority of the captain over the 
privileges of junior officers.  As early as 1819, captains such as Thomas Macdonough and John 
Rodgers were trying with limited success to keep the junior officers of the Mediterranean 
squadron in line.87 While this particular source of friction was never completely eradicated in the 
Navy, the court’s acceptance of Stewart’s ability to confine an officer to quarters for so long 
represented the end of a significant shift that had occurred gradually since 1807 when the 
Chesapeake officers had requested and received a court of inquiry to allocate blame to their 
captain. 
The court’s ruling was also significant because it firmly established Southard’s “better 
remedy” of using tribunals to clear an officer’s reputation.  As James Barron (who also presided 
over Stewart’s court-martial) stated in the closing remarks: “when rumors and reports are unduly 
and industriously disseminated … to impair the high standing and usefulness of an officer … it 
becomes the duty of the Executive to afford such officer by the convention of a proper tribunal 
an ample opportunity of vindicating himself before the world”88 Barron –  whose return to the 
service in spite of his unfavorable reputation was possible only because of a similar court of 
inquiry – certainly understood the need for such a system.   
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The Kennon, Porter, and Stewart courts-martial represent a turning point in the early Navy.  
Beforehand, officers considered it their right to appeal to the press to clear their names, and the 
Navy Department acquiesced as discontent junior officers such as Heath, Shaw, and Abbot 
published their opinions of their court-martial proceedings.  Many people in and out of the 
service recognized that this process of laying all of the conflicts within the Navy before the 
public was detrimental to the reputation of the service and enflamed the controversies between 
officers. But little was done to stop the practice until after the Kennon trial.  Porter’s court-
martial was the first major tribunal after implementation of the new norm of private tribunals, 
with the administration taking a more active role in controlling what information was released to 
the public. Stewart’s court-martial continued the Navy’s trend of tightening the discipline on 
junior officers, and helped firmly establish the precedent of courts-martial and inquiries as the 
acceptable way of resolving disputes.  Between them, these three tribunals signal a shift in the 
culture of honor and status that were sought in the Navy. 
66 
Chapter IV: Dueling in the Navy 
 
Many scholars believe the practice of dueling derived from the medieval concept of “judicial 
combat.”1 When William the Conqueror established the rules of chivalry in eleventh century 
England, he established a set of rules to govern the manner in which knights settled disputes 
between each other.  In these situations, the nobles would joust (or fight on foot) in single 
combat in the belief that God would decide the winner.2  In much the same way that the sport of 
fencing would later emerge, jousting became a game: youth of noble birth were trained in 
fighting from horseback and competed against each other in tournaments.   
Single combat as a mode of settling disputes persisted in spite of the eventual decline of the 
joust, but became more private.  The weapons and rules also changed with time.  The emphasis 
on God’s role in determining the outcome of these combats gradually disappeared, and dueling 
instead became a method of defending personal honor and privilege amongst the nobility.  
Because the nobles drew their legitimacy from their martial ancestors whose elevated status 
came from their role as defenders of the state, duels reaffirmed the participant’s noble status by 
demonstrating their martial prowess and, most importantly, courage. 3  In the words of historian 
Joanne Freeman, the purpose of the practice was to demonstrate “above all—willingness to 
sacrifice one’s life for one’s honor.”4  Duels did not need to be lethal to resolve a dispute; once 
the men had proven their honorable character, both parties could forgo the conflict. 
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The Code Duello was a document that laid out a formal process for modern dueling that 
served as the guide for the United States and much of the Anglophone world.5 Once a gentleman 
had been insulted, he would ask a friend to serve as his “second” to make the arrangements on 
his behalf.  The offended gentleman then issued a notice to the offender specifying why he felt 
offended, and implying that he believed a duel was necessary to satisfy his honor.  The recipient 
would appoint his own second, and depending on the situation either try to provide an apology or 
explanation, or allow the correspondence to escalate in tone.  Their communications would 
usually culminate in one party issuing a challenge, which was difficult for a gentleman to refuse 
without appearing to be a coward. This correspondence was usually delivered through the 
seconds, who were tasked with attempting to find a means of reconciling the two “principals,” 
and – if reconciliation failed – agree upon a fair time, location, and mode of combat.6 
The most common mode of dueling in the early 1800s seems to have been with smoothbore 
pistols at a distance of at least ten paces, but if the principals were out for blood, or one of the 
principals was not a good marksman, affairs of honor were sometimes fought at murderously 
short distances of three to eight paces.7  At this range, not only was it difficult to miss, but 
wounds that normally would not have been serious had enough force of impact to kill.  In 
contrast, principals who were concerned primarily with preserving their honor or who were 
skilled marksmen might choose to fight from a farther distance.  In these situations they might 
aim for a nonlethal shot at their opponent’s hip.8  On rare occasions, officers would deliberately 
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fire their shots in the air or not shoot at all, after secretly informing their seconds of their 
intentions beforehand (otherwise it would appear cowardly).9 
Some historians theorize that dueling, which was originally uncommon in colonies, became 
entrenched during the Revolutionary War through contact with British and French officers.10  
The practice had certainly been known in the Royal Navy at least as far back as 1688.11  
Whatever the cause, by the end of the eighteenth century dueling had become widespread in the 
United States.  Although New Englanders generally did not approve, the practice was established 
throughout the rest of the country, and particularly in the South. 12  In addition to geographic 
differences, dueling featured more prominently in certain careers.  In particular, figures who 
articulated opinions in the public forum had a tendency to provoke challenges (or issue them as a 
means of redress).  Consequently, people such as politicians and newspaper editors were 
common participants in “affairs of honor” or “interviews” as duels were sometimes called.13  In 
the case of politicians, these duels were often fought partly so that these leaders could reinforce 
their legitimacy with claims of personal honor.14   
 
Dueling in the Navy 
The officers challenged other men to duels to preserve their personal reputations as 
gentlemen and to defend the honor the nation and naval service. Not all challenges resulted in a 
duel.  When the officers were younger and had not proven themselves in combat, they were more 
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likely to end up at the dueling grounds unless a superior officer intervened.  As they matured, 
challenges were typically issued for different reasons and were more often mediated by friends.  
Regardless of the age of the officers or the immediate cause of a challenge, almost all duels were 
fought at least indirectly over personal reputation. While duels themselves might be somewhat 
private, the institution of dueling was usually fairly public in that the purpose was to reaffirm the 
gentleman’s character to peers or the nation.  Furthermore, although many of the disputes leading 
to challenges were petty and childish, and most people believed the practice was unacceptable, it 
was almost always tolerated by American society and government. This state of affairs existed 
through the infamous Barron/Decatur duel in 1820, which turned the opinions of the public and 
many officers against dueling in the Navy.   
Dueling in the early Navy, according to Ian Toll “approached the proportions of an 
epidemic.”15 Naval historians estimate that between the founding of the Navy and the middle of 
the nineteenth century, around 100 duels were fought between the officers.16  At least thirty-six 
officers died in duels during this period, eighteen of them by the end of the War of 1812.17  The 
vast majority of these encounters were between untested junior officers who held “posts of 
immediate fighting responsibility,” whose bravery could easily be questioned by their peers.18  
Courage being one of the primary virtues of a gentleman, these officers felt especially compelled 
to duel.  If they refused, they faced ostracization.19  Once an officer had established a reputation 
for bravery, however, it was easier to avoid duels without looking like a coward.  
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Affairs of honor were also usually between officers of relatively equal ranks.  Those who 
were not gentlemen were, of course, not entitled to the respect of a duel.  It was also 
understandably considered somewhat taboo in the Navy to challenge a superior officer.  Instead 
of using the code of honor to reinforce shipboard hierarchy, the ability to challenge superiors 
could destroy order.  As George Washington once wisely wrote to Continental Army General 
Nathaniel Greene, “if a commanding officer is responsible for private calls for the discharge of 
public duty, he has a dagger always at his breast…. In a word, he is no longer a free agent in 
office as there are few military decisions which are not offensive to one party or the other.”20  
Furthermore, because rank was based on honor, a perception existed (and still does in today’s 
military) that higher ranking officers are more honorable.21 Affairs of honor also frequently 
occurred between naval and marine officers, as they served and lived together on the same ships, 
and because honor was of equal import to maintaining their authority.22 Duels that were fought 
fairly and adhered to these norms and structures rarely resulted in prosecution or even adverse 
effects upon the careers of the survivors.23 
 
Ungentlemanly Conduct 
Even taking into account society’s expectation that young military officers would duel more 
than the average citizen, the number of duels that occurred in the early Navy was remarkable 
considering the disapproval of the practice voiced by many political and religious figures and 
other officers.  After Navy Lieutenant Allen McKenzie died in a duel with a fellow lieutenant in 
1799, a Presbyterian minister stated in the eulogy that:  
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We are called to surround the grave of a soldier who has fallen by the arm of a 
brother soldier, the victim of mistaken honor, slain in the prime of life … here let all 
who are directed by false honor behold its effects…. He has taken a solemn departure 
from this world, and dark and dismal are the shades of night that descend upon his 
tomb.  To his Judge he has gone to answer.24 
 
The fact that the clergyman questioned the salvation of the young officer at his funeral – 
presumably in front of his friends or family – reveals the minister’s strong opposition.  
Several of “Preble’s Boys” also disapproved of the practice, especially by the time they 
became captains.  Captain Thomas Macdonough was one notable example.  Macdonough was 
best known for defeating a British flotilla at the Battle of Plattsburgh in what became one of the 
last battles of the War of 1812, a victory that won him considerable renown.  In 1819, however, 
he refused to serve as second to his friend Stephen Decatur because he disapproved a dueling.25  
The most outspoken opponent of the institution was Captain Alexander Murray, a veteran 
captain of the Continental Navy who served with reasonable success in the US Navy until 
1821.26  While commanding the Constellation, Murray refused to attend the funeral for a marine 
captain under his command who was killed in a duel with a Navy lieutenant.  He even suggested 
that the epithet on the captain’s tombstone should observe that he “had fallen a victim to a false 
idea of honor.”27  He was also the first officer to suggest that dueling be made a court-martial 
offense in the Navy, although the Navy Department ignored his suggestion.28 
Officers such as Murray and Macdonough, who unequivocally opposed dueling, were the 
exception in the Navy.  While the corps as a whole generally claimed to share the opinions of 
mainstream society that dueling was morally reprehensible, it simultaneously viewed dueling as 
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an unavoidable part of being an officer and gentleman. Arthur Sinclair remarked that although 
dueling was a practice that conflicted “with the morality … of our country,” in some situations, 
duels were “a misfortune for which there was no honorable remedy.”29 Sinclair hints at a conflict 
that many officers felt: while a gentleman had a moral duty to uphold his honor, he also had a 
duty to uphold his personal moral code.  An even clearer example of the ideology of the duel can 
be seen in the letters that Stephen Decatur and James Barron exchanged leading up to a challenge 
in 1820.  Decatur wrote Barron: 
I do not think that fighting duels, under any circumstances, can raise the reputation of 
any man, and have long since discovered, that it is not even an unerring criterion of 
personal courage ... but, in my opinion, the man who makes arms his profession, is 
not at liberty to decline an invitation from any person, who is not so far degraded, as 
to be beneath his notice.30   
 
Barron’s response reveals his similar justification of dueling: 
I consider [dueling] a barbarous practice which ought to be exploded from civilized 
society; but, sir, there may be causes of such extraordinary and aggravated insult and 
injury, received by an individual, as to render an appeal to arms … absolutely 
essential…. I feel myself constrained, by every tie that binds me to society, by all that 
can make life desirable to me, to resort to this mode … as the only alternative … for 
the preservation of my honor.31 
 
Barron’s statement elaborates on Decatur’s response that military men were “not at liberty to 
decline an invitation,” by explaining that as gentlemen, an officer’s duty to protect his personal 
honor was compulsive – it was even more important than his life or moral beliefs.  In Decatur’s 
mind, this was because of his status as an actual warrior, but for most men it was part of being a 
gentleman (and therefore, an heir to the warrior aristocracy).  Some officers like Macdonough 
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obviously identified with a different code of personal honor espoused by many religious 
institutions – where honor was based on moral righteousness, and not superior to it.  But as these 
remarks and the multitude of duels demonstrate, the views of those who considered dueling a 
necessary part of being a gentleman prevailed in the early Navy. 
If the officers were unable or reluctant to suppress dueling, their civilian leaders could have 
banned the practice instead. However, many political figures expressed their disapproval but 
were unwilling to interfere for a variety of reasons.  Secretaries of the Navy Robert Smith (1801-
1809) and Paul Hamilton (1808-1813) both condemned the practice but did nothing.  Christopher 
McKee argues that their lack of anti-dueling policy was because they deemed it too great a 
stretch of the Act for Better government of the Navy, and because they feared that other officers 
would not convict a duelist in a court-martial.32   
After the Burr/Hamilton duel in 1804, which helped turn the nation against dueling, almost 
nothing was done to end the practice.  Later that year, a midshipman named Cornelius DeKraft 
was sent home from the Mediterranean for killing a fellow midshipman, and ordered to report to 
Washington D.C. – presumably because of his duel.  But the government did not punish DeKraft, 
because even after the public outcry against dueling, the government still believed that these 
affairs of honor were important for an officer to maintain his identity.  In fact, Congressman 
Joseph Nicholson of Maryland, the father of the dead midshipman, asked the Navy not to punish 
DeKraft, citing the “prevalent example of older, wiser, and more exalted men.”33  Congress – the 
only group who had unquestionable power to outlaw dueling – demonstrated that it did not 
consider ending the practice a priority in the Navy. In the aftermath of the Burr/Hamilton duel, 
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Congress banned dueling in the Army in 1806, but did not alter anything about the dueling 
policy in the Navy of this period.34  The reason for this discrepancy is not obvious, but the fact 
that Congress did not change the Navy’s regulations suggests that legislators considered the 
practice important to the Navy’s ability to fulfill its duties.  By 1806, the nation was in a period 
of peace, and the Army consequently had little occasion to defend the national honor.  As the 
Napoleonic wars continued to rage in Europe, however, the Navy was still needed to protect the 
sovereignty of the flag at sea and interact with often unfriendly governments 
 
Dueling and Personal Honor among Junior Officers 
Although the boundaries between different types of honor were blurry during this period, 
many duels were still based primarily on matters of personal honor.  Officers issued challenges 
when they felt that they had been defamed, their rights had been abused, or their courage 
questioned.  These affairs of honor demonstrate the centrality of these men’s self-perception as 
gentlemen to their identities as officers.  While other conflicts in the corps also show the value of 
personal honor to the officers, the challenges they issued reveal that being a gentlemen was, in 
many cases, more valuable than the men’s lives.  
When the officers were younger, protecting their reputation generally meant defending their 
courage or otherwise proving that they were worthy of being considered officers and gentlemen.  
This often led to extremely petty or even childish duels – one lieutenant was killed in 1803 over 
“preference in a simple game of billiards.”35 There are numerous examples of duels between 
Preble’s Boys when they were midshipmen and lieutenants, but only a few must be examined to 
highlight the major characteristics of dueling among these officers.  One such incident occurred 
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in October 1802 between Navy Lieutenant Richard Lawson and Marine Corps Captain James 
McKnight, Stephen Decatur’s brother-in-law.36  After a long-standing dispute, Lawson 
challenged McKnight to a duel at three paces while the two were serving on the Constellation 
near Leghorn, Italy.  At such a short distance, it would be almost impossible to miss a shot, so 
Lieutenant David Porter, McKnight’s second, refused.  McKnight called Lawson a coward and 
“an Assassin for proposing so short a distance,” and Lawson responded by circulating a note to 
the other officers on the ship that he had “proved [McKnight] a coward.” 37  The pair would not 
abandon the dispute with these accusations of cowardice still standing, so they agreed to duel at 
the longer (but still extremely dangerous) distance of six paces.  McKnight was killed in the first 
exchange of fire. This duel was typical of the duels between the younger members of the corps, 
because it demonstrates the compulsion that many felt to demonstrate their courage publicly.  In 
the words of Christopher McKee “no nineteen-year-old midshipman, one who had never 
established his bravery through combat, could in that society have his courage challenged and 
still remain a member in good standing of his peer group.”38 
The need of many untested midshipmen to prove their courage to their fellow officers caused 
a similar fatal duel in August 1808.  The officer’s commanding officer, Commodore John 
Rodgers, wrote Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith: 
I at present am unable to acquaint you of the origin of the quarrel of these two young 
men.  But from the information I have been able to collect … it was something of a 
very trivial nature.  Indeed it would appear that they went out rather from motives of 
bravado than anything else, and after getting on the ground were ashamed to return 
without fighting.39 
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Another (particularly dramatic) confrontation between junior officers occurred on the United 
States during the Quasi-War in 1798, when Midshipman Stephen Decatur joking called his close 
friend Midshipman Richard Somers a “fool” in response to Somers’ remark about the outfit 
Decatur was wearing.  Neither of the pair thought anything of the exchange until the next day, 
when five or six of the other junior officers refused to dine with Somers on the grounds that he 
had been cowardly by accepting Decatur’s insult.40  Decatur offered to serve dinner to the whole 
party and assure them that he had not intended an insult, but Somers responded that “They have 
allowed themselves to suspect my courage.  I must convince them that they are mistaken, and my 
only course is to fight them all.”41  Somers challenged all of them, and fought three duels in 
sequence.  By the third duel, he was so badly injured that he had to fight while sitting down, with 
Decatur supporting his pistol arm.  After this duel, the rest of the officers decided to end the 
affair, agreeing that Somers had proved his courage.42 
While this duel was not exactly typical of all the officers, it is important to understanding the 
corps for three reasons.  Firstly, during this first year of the seagoing Navy (and this early stage 
in its first war) the officers as a group had almost no experience in battle, and so were especially 
determined to prove their courage.  Secondly, Decatur continued his career in the Navy and 
participated in several more affairs of honor.  This duel – one of the earliest in which he was 
involved – demonstrates his background in dueling during his youth, and helps demonstrate 
contrast in his feelings on the practice by the time he had matured.  Finally, a duel as bold and 
exciting as this one captures the romantic sensibilities of the time, and would almost certainly 
serve as a model of honorable behavior to those officers who heard the story.  As Charles 
Stewart’s biographer explained, Stewart watched a duel that Decatur fought on Stewart’s first 
                                                           
40
 Toll, Six Frigates, 220; Lewis, The Romantic Decatur, 197-8. 
41
 Lewis, The Romantic Decatur, 197. 
42
 Toll, Six Frigates, 220. 
77 
war cruise in 1799, and the duel became Stewart’s most vivid memory of the cruise.43 In the 
relatively small community of the Navy, where men were confined to ships for months at a time 
with few sources of entertainment but each other’s company, officers certainly shared stories 
such as this with their peers.  Therefore, in an environment like the Navy’s, it is likely that 
Somers’ duel became something of a legend and an ideal of dueling for the young officers.   
 
Duels and Personal Honor among Senior Officers 
For the officers of the generation who reached the senior ranks of master commandant or 
captain, challenges were issued with more care.  The disputes resulted from the intense value that 
the officers placed on their public reputation.  This was partly because those who were successful 
and popular with the public and their peers were especially likely to be posted at a profitable 
navy yard or a command that carried the possibility of prize money – a system that encouraged 
officers to amplify their reputations as much as possible to look better than their rivals.  
Additionally, because the officers all valued honor so much, even a senior officer could be 
viewed with disrespect by peers and civilian associates if too great an insult was ignored.  
Nevertheless, challenges did not usually reach the dueling field because the senior officers had 
already proved their courage in battle; instead, many of the duels were peacefully arbitrated by 
the principals and their seconds, or the disputes died out before the arrangements could be made.  
The number of captains in this generation was fairly small, but even so, many of the same 
officers seemed to be involved in the disputes.   
John Rodgers seemed especially prone to these conflicts.  He assumed command of the 
Mediterranean Squadron in 1803 after his frustratingly passive superior, Commodore Richard 
Morris, was relieved.  Almost immediately, however, Commodore Edward Preble arrived with 
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orders to relieve Rodgers.44  Rodgers was doubtless angered by losing exclusive leadership of the 
Barbary War (and the credit for success and prize-money that would accompany the command).  
His frustration at being superseded even caused him to challenge Preble to a duel.45  
Nevertheless, he followed his orders to return to the United States, where he petitioned the 
Secretary of the Navy to send him back to the war.  His pleading letter reveals how desperately 
Rodgers wanted the honor and glory associated with victory: “[I] should be greatly mortified, if 
the Congress did not share a part of the Credit to be derived, in the reduction of Tripoli by 
inscribing a lasting & Honorable remembrance of her name on its Walls.”46  The Secretary 
agreed to reassign him to the Mediterranean in Congress in spring 1804.  
Although Rodgers was pleased to return to the fight, he was almost certainly disappointed 
that he still did not have the opportunity to lead the war.  He served as second in command to 
Commodore Samuel Barron – elder brother of Captain James Barron, who was also serving in 
the Mediterranean Squadron.  Samuel fell ill in September, which could have been the 
opportunity Rodgers was looking for to command the squadron.  However, Barron did not 
relinquish his command immediately– preferring instead to use his brother as an intermediary in 
his duties.  Rodgers felt cheated; he blamed James for privately convincing Samuel to retain his 
command while “assuring [Rodgers] with the gravity of a Judas that he had been endeavoring to 
prevail on his brother to resign.”47  Little evidence currently exists to support the belief that 
James Barron actually undermined Rodgers’ reputation to his brother.  In fact, Samuel had 
temporarily placed Rodgers in command of the squadron after he had first fallen ill in fall 1804, 
                                                           
44
 John H. Schroeder, Commodore John Rodgers: Paragon of the Early American Navy. (Gainesville, FL: 
University Press of Florida, 2006), 34-5. 
45
 Toll, Six Frigates, 252.  The amount of time which passed before they both returned to the US and could make 
arrangements seems to have allowed the dispute to fizzle out before the duel was actually arranged. See Schroeder, 
Commodore John Rodgers, 53-54. 
46
 Rodgers to Smith, 30 August 1804, quoted in Schroeder, Commodore John Rodgers, 41. 
47
 Latshaw, “Flawed Judgment,” 387-8; Lewis, The Romantic Decatur, 221. 
79 
and handed it over to Rodgers again in May 1805 – assuring Rodgers that he had full confidence 
in him.48 
These details notwithstanding, Rodgers attacked Barron’s character repeatedly.  After the 
war, Rodgers told his friends – including officers such as Captain William Bainbridge, “My 
Character … has been aspersed in the most gross manner.”49  Rodgers blamed Barron for these 
attacks to his reputation, and Barron replied that he would “call on him to answer in a proper 
place and time.” Rodgers asked his friend Lieutenant David Porter to tell Barron that “if I do not 
hear from him, I shall impute it to a want in him of what no Gentleman – one who wears a 
uniform – should be deficient in” (courage).50  
Rodgers’ desired confrontation never occurred, however.  Both men were captains, and had 
less need to prove their courage by dueling.  James Barron had not yet endured the shame of the 
Chesapeake incident, and could therefore take his time getting around to the duel; he too had 
become sick, and he told Rodgers that he would not be able to travel to Washington, D.C. for 
their encounter until he recovered.51  During this delay, Rodgers married his fiancé of over a 
year, which must have distracted him from the dispute and made the possibility of his death or 
injury seem more acute.  Perhaps most importantly, the men’s seconds took their job of avoiding 
an altercation seriously.  Rodgers’ second, Commodore Thomas Tingey, wrote to Barron’s 
second that he hoped that the delay caused by Barron’s illness would “give such time for 
reflection as to prevent the most probably fatal recourse that has been heretofore 
contemplated.”52 After the wedding, Tingey assured Rodgers that he could not “gain an atom by 
                                                           
48
 Schroeder, Commodore John Rodgers, 41, 44-5. 
49
 Rodgers to Lear, 17 May 1806, quoted in Ibid., 53. 
50
 Toll, Six Frigates, 260. 
51
 Thomas Tingey to Franklin Wharton, 26 August 1806, James Barron Papers, Box 1:36, Manuscript Division, 
Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va. 
52
 Thomas Tingey to Franklin Wharton, 1 January 1807, James Barron Papers, Box 1:36, Manuscript Division, 
Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va.  Commodore Tingey was a veteran of 
80 
the result of such a contest as this,” and that all that would was necessary to end the affair 
respectably was “a small and honorable acknowledgement” of his amity to Barron. 53  Although 
Rodgers continued to dislike James Barron, he chose to issue such an acknowledgement, and 
Barron reciprocated. The seconds then circulated a notice stating that the men had settled their 
differences on terms “highly honorable to both parties.”  Attached to this notice was a letter from 
one of their friends to Captain Rodgers, stating: 
It has been intimated to me … that captain Barron does not now perceive the 
necessity of calling on you … but feels himself injured by the style of your reply.  As 
I am sure that neither you nor any other person can entertain a suspicion dishonorable 
to captain Barron; it is the opinion of your friends, that you have only to say, that 
your reply was the hasty suggestion of the moment … that was excited by so 
unexspected [sic] a notification.  They think that you may say this with honor, and 
that by so doing you will put an end to an affair of much concern to your friends, and 
particularly so to the secretary of the navy…. I would not recommend to you a 
measure that I thought you could not adopt with honor.54 
 
Efforts like this by the officers’ seconds and other friends helped prevent the Rodgers/Barron 
dispute from ending in a duel.  Additionally, Rodgers’ marriage and his realization that he did 
not need to duel to defend his reputation represent two of the other reasons why Rogers (and 
most other senior officers) did not resort to gunplay.  Furthermore, public opinion was not a 
major source of compulsion to duel, because knowledge of the dispute was limited mainly to 
some of their colleagues and personal friends, and neither captain was particularly famous at this 
point in their careers.  The remark by Rodgers’ friend about the Secretary of the Navy’s concern 
suggests that the publicity that a duel might attract could actually damage the image of the Navy, 
and that possible fatalities would hurt the service by thinning out the fairly small group of 
captains.   
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One instance where a captain did participate in a duel with another officer occurred on 
October 19, 1817.  After marine Captain John Heath published his pamphlet condemning 
Commodore Perry and his lenient trial, the dispute between the two officers remained the subject 
of public attention.  Heath accused Perry of “the most consummate arrogance, and … a spirit of 
the rankest malevolence.”  Perry, for his part, considered Heath “destitute of truth, of honor & of 
spirit.”55  Under mounting pressure from the public for a resolution to the dispute, Perry accepted 
a challenge from Heath, and chose Stephen Decatur as his second.  When the two men met in 
Hoboken, New Jersey, only one shot was fired.  Heath missed his opponent; Perry who despised 
dueling, had only accepted the duel on the secret condition that he would not fire (which Decatur 
announced after Heath had pulled the trigger).56   
The duel was unorthodox in several ways.  First, it was not fully acceptable in the Navy for 
officers like Heath to challenge their superiors, and for their superiors to accept (although Heath 
had been dismissed from the Marine Corps in an 1817 personnel reduction).  Secondly, it was 
even rarer for captains with military victories to their credit to accept a duel at all.  Even though 
their sense of honor might make them feel obliged to duel, the need to protect their reputation 
among their peers and the public was considerably lessened, which removed much of the 
impetus. Finally, refusing to fire a shot was almost unheard of in American duels at this time.57  
In the public, however, with both a Christian disdain and tacit acquiescence in the practice, many 
considered Perry’s actions to be admirable.  In an address to the House of Representatives, 
Speaker of the House Henry Clay acknowledged that “the public mind remained agitated and 
unappeased until the recent atonement, so honorably made by the gallant commodore.”58 Heath 
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also accepted this outcome as a vindication of his honor, and the dispute between the two 
dissipated. 
 
Duels and Collective Honor  
 Although many affairs of honor occurred within the corps, most of the challenges issued 
over insults to collective honor were, predictably, against outsiders.  As one might guess, insults 
to collective honor were directed at a group with which an officer identified, rather than against 
his character personally.  Although defending the flag and the Navy were integral sources of an 
officer’s status, older officers rarely, if ever, dueled over matters of collective honor.  Dueling 
foreigners or outsiders in the name of the Navy or the nation was an excellent way for younger 
officers to prove their courage.  Captains, on the other hand, usually had families and a secure 
reputation, so there was no need to risk their lives over petty insults. 
Stephen Decatur was involved in two duels concerning the honor of the US Navy.  The first 
occurred in 1799 shortly after his promotion to lieutenant on the United States.  Several of the 
sailors under his command attempted to join a merchant ship, and when Decatur went aboard to 
retrieve the men, the vessel’s chief mate cursed him and the Navy.59  Decatur’s father advised 
him that he had to seek redress for this disrespect.  When the chief mate refused to apologize, 
Decatur chose his friend Richard Somers to serve as his second, and a duel was arranged.  The 
mate missed his shot, and Decatur wounded his opponent in the hip (as he had intended, 
according to his shipmate Lieutenant Charles Stewart). 
Later, while serving as first lieutenant of the Essex during the first Barbary War 1801, 
Decatur had another altercation in defense of the Navy.  Supposedly, while the ship was docked 
in Barcelona under the command of Captain William Bainbridge, many citizens of the city 
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praised her orderly appearance compared to the vessels of the Spanish Navy.60  Several junior 
Spanish officers were offended at this, and began harassing the American officers when they 
passed the Spanish guard boat to go ashore.  One night Bainbridge’s barge was detained and the 
Spaniards requested that he board their boat.  He refused and rowed away, defying numerous 
curses and threats from the officers.  Captain Bainbridge responded with a letter to the leader of 
Spanish naval forces in the region, complaining that his treatment was “so inconsistent with the 
character of the officers of the American Navy that I did not feel disposed to submit to it, 
although exposed in an unarmed boat.”61  Bainbridge’s second-in-command, Stephen Decatur, 
was not so tame in his response.  When he was detained by the same guard boat a few nights 
later, he advised the commanding officer that he would return in the morning.  Decatur went 
back to the ship in the morning to challenge the Spanish commander who had detained them, but 
when he found out that their commander was ashore, Decatur replied: “well then, tell him that 
Lieutenant Decatur of the frigate Essex pronounces him a cowardly scoundrel, and that, when 
they meet on shore, he will cut his ears off.”62  In spite of Decatur’s blatant provocation of a 
duel, the Spanish authorities were able to prevent the dispute from reaching the shore through 
negotiations with the US consul and by issuing an order that the Spanish Navy “treat all the 
officers of the United States with courtesy and respect.”63   
The dramatic contrast in the courses taken by Captain Bainbridge and Lieutenant Decatur 
provide another example of the differences in dispute resolution between captains and junior 
officers.  Although both Bainbridge and Decatur cared greatly about their honor and were only 
five years apart in age, Bainbridge – as a captain – was more secure in his status.  He had nothing 
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to gain personally by dueling, especially if he was able to resolve the situation using the other, 
diplomatic means available to him.  Decatur had not yet achieved his great personal success in 
burning the Philadelphia and the accompanying promotion to captain.  Furthermore, the Navy 
Department would probably have been far less accepting of Bainbridge dueling because, as a 
captain, he would be more conspicuous and less expendable than a lieutenant. 
Additionally, in cases like this, where the Navy’s honor was challenged overseas, the honor 
of the service came to equate to the honor of the nation – foreign officers were treated as 
representatives of their country, and therefore insulting an officer was comparable to insulting a 
diplomat.  This strong relationship between the honor of the Navy and the national honor is one 
of the reasons that the corps sought to defend the reputation of the service and its members’ 
privileges as officers.  Most of the duels fought over national honor were with British officers or 
officials – presumably because of the increased interaction facilitated by a common language and 
the diplomatic tensions between the two nations.  There are numerous records of friendly 
interactions between Americans and Britons, but the tensions between the two groups often 
induced eager younger officers to duel. 64  In 1804, one midshipman even wrote that the two 
groups of officers “meet on shore but to fight & insult each other.”65  The problem continued 
even after the War of 1812.  In June 1819, for example, Lieutenant Robert Stockton and Purser 
Benjamin Bourne of the Mediterranean Squadron fought a series duels with the British garrison 
of Gibraltar.66 
As was often the case, Stephen Decatur was involved in one of the most sensational 
examples of dueling over national honor.  The incident occurred in 1803 while William 
Bainbridge’s younger brother Joseph was on liberty at Malta. While attending a theatre 
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performance with a shipmate, the midshipman heard an Englishman remark that “Those Yankees 
will never stand the smell of powder.”  The two officers went into the lobby to decide on how to 
address the insult, but the Englishman followed them, rudely brushing past Joseph’s shoulder 
three times until the aggravated midshipman punched him in the face.67  The next day, the 
aggressor – a skilled duelist and private secretary of the Governor of Malta – sent a challenge to 
Bainbridge, and Lieutenant Decatur asked to serve as his second.  Because Joseph had never 
fought a duel and was not an especially good shot, Decatur insisted on the dangerous distance of 
only four paces.  When the other second remarked “this looks like murder, sir,” Decatur retorted 
“No, sir, this looks like death, but not like murder.” When the two parties met shortly thereafter, 
the Englishman was mortally wounded and Bainbridge escaped unscathed. 68  
Bainbridge could have refused the duel and, after the squadron sailed, been safe from any 
threats similar to those that Decatur had used to against the Spanish officer.  However, this 
course of action would have forfeited his honorable reputation among the other gentlemen of 
Malta and even his fellow officers.  Bainbridge’s duel was as much about proving his personal 
honor as it was defending the honor of the flag or the corps. Nevertheless, conflicts with 
outsiders such as this had characteristics that made them different from those within the service.  
Because the corps was fairly small, officers working closely with their peers could very easily 
step on each other’s toes and offend each other’s personal honor.  However, while personal 
honor was a matter of ranking individuals and protecting status, collective honor helped unify the 
officers behind the same source of validation.  In this regard, collective honor was a less divisive 
source of legitimacy for the officers.   
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Barron and Decatur 
The duel between Commodores James Barron and Stephen Decatur had been a long time 
coming.  The two men were supposedly very close when Decatur joined the Navy and was 
posted under Lieutenant Barron on the United States in 1798, so historians have long sought to 
pin down a specific point when their relationship began to deteriorate.  Barron seems to have 
believed that the initial break occurred over a misunderstood conversation between himself, a 
companion, and Barron in 1806, in which Decatur may have perceived that Barron was 
criticizing his decision to court a woman named Susan Wheeler – the illegitimate daughter of a 
wealthy Norfolk businessman.  Other evidence suggests that Decatur lost respect for Barron a 
few weeks later after he avoided the duel with Commodore John Rodgers.  Both James and his 
brother noted that Decatur acted, in the words of Barron’s biographer William Oliver Stevens, 
“so frankly hostile” towards James the next time the two met that the Barron brothers felt the 
need to call on him for an explanation (although the visit did little to improve their relations or 
even clear up the reason for Decatur’s behavior).69  
The most visible cause of the enmity between the pair was the Chesapeake-Leopard affair.  
Decatur was stationed in Norfolk at the time of the court of inquiry, and attended many of the 
hearings.  He decided during the inquiry that he blamed Barron for the incident, but was ordered 
by Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith to sit as a judge in Barron’s court-martial anyway on a 
panel presided by Rodgers. 70  The court’s sentence ruined Barron: with no income except some 
small earnings from a few minor inventions, Barron was forced to command merchant ships in 
Europe.  When the War of 1812 broke out, the impoverished captain was stranded in 
Copenhagen while struggling to support a sick wife and six children.  When he eventually 
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scraped together enough money to return in December 1818, the Navy Board of Commissioners 
consisting of Rodgers, Decatur, and David Porter (all members of his court-martial) refused to 
return him to active duty. 71 
The Navy at this period was characterized by a high level of competition between officers as 
the Navy was downsized after the War of 1812.  There were not enough captain billets to go 
around, which in turn slowed promotion for junior officers.  Furthermore, with fewer 
opportunities for prize money, the captains competed with each other for the most lucrative 
posts.72  This sense of competition played a role in keeping Barron out of the Navy.  In a letter to 
Barron on in 1819, Decatur explains that he rejected Barron’s application for an active duty 
assignment partly because “there was not employment for all the officers who had faithfully 
discharged their duty to their country in the hour of trial; and that it would be doing an act of 
injustice to employ you, to the exclusion of any one of them.”73  Furthermore, Decatur himself 
had an interest in barring Barron from the Navy.  If Barron returned, he would be one of the few 
officers in the Navy who would be senior to Decatur.74  Decatur clearly had very little respect for 
Barron, and the thought of taking orders from the disgraced captain must have appalled him.   
By this point, Barron believed he had suffered too much at the hands of Decatur and his 
allies, and when he heard rumors that his antagonist had been insulting him in the company of 
junior captains, Barron wrote to Decatur demanding redress.  Their letters leading to the duel are 
among the most revealing documents available on the ideology of honor and duty in the early 
officer corps.  Both men not only laid out their reasons for their enmity toward each other, but 
openly wrote for an audience in the expectation that their words would be circulated. The two 
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men’s biting critiques of each, therefore, reflect both their personal feelings and their opinions of 
the values held by their peers and American society.  As Decatur explained in one letter: “The 
matter, did not deserve so dispassionate and historical a notice as I have given it; and had I 
believed it would receive no other inspection than yours, I should have spared myself the 
trouble.”75 Baron replied that “as you have intimated that our correspondence is to go before the 
public, I feel it a duty I owe to myself, and to the world, to reply particularly to the many 
calumnious charges and aspersions which your ‘dispassionate and historical notice’ … so 
abundantly teems; wishing you, sir … ‘distinctly to understand’ that it is not for you alone … 
that I take this course.”76   
Barron complained of Decatur’s participation in the court-martial, arguing that “you were to 
act under the solemn sanction of an oath, to render me impartial justice upon the very testimony 
… from which you [had drawn] ‘an opinion, altogether unfavorable to me.’  How such conduct 
can be reconciled with the principles of common honor and justice, is to me, inexplicable,” He 
further accuses Decatur of speaking “injuriously of [him] to junior officers,” and in unfairly 
barring him from reassignment. 77  Decatur, for his part, accused Barron of cowardice, deceit, 
and attempting to “fight his character up” by provoking a duel.78 As their exchanges became 
increasingly caustic and broke off entirely, Barron finally issued a challenge: 
In [your letter] you say that you have not to inform me that you shall pay no further 
attention to any communication that I may make to you other than a direct call to the 
field; in answer to which I have only to reply, that whenever you will consent to meet 
me on fair and equal grounds, … you are at liberty to view this as that call; …as for 
your charges and remarks, I regard them not, particularly your sympathy; you know 
not such a feeling – I cannot be suspect of making the attempt to excite it.79 
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Decatur replied: “I have received your communication of the 16th, and am at a loss to know 
what your intention is.  If you intend it as a challenge, I accept it.”80  The pair met at 
Bladensburg, Maryland on March 22, 1820 with their seconds – fellow captains William 
Bainbridge for Decatur, and Jesse Elliott for Barron –  and a party of about three other people. 
The duel was set to occur at the unusually short distance of eight paces.81  According to a 
witness, as the pair took their places, Barron remarked that, “he hoped, on meeting in another 
world, they would be better friends than they had been.”  Decatur replied “I have never been 
your enemy, Sir.”82 
This exchange is generally believed to be a signal of both parties’ willingness to reconcile, 
but Bainbridge and Elliott ignored the remark and ordered both parties to prepare to fire.83  Both 
men aimed for each other’s hips, and hit their targets.  Both wounds appeared mortal, so as soon 
as the shots were fired, Elliott fled in Barron’s carriage to avoid arrest. Commodores Rodgers 
and Porter emerged from nearby, where they had been waiting for the result of the duel.  Decatur 
and Barron seem to have felt at least partially reconciled as they lay together on the ground, and 
eventually Decatur was taken back to his house, where he died that evening.  News of the duels 
was carried extensively in newspapers throughout America, and both houses of Congress 
adjourned so that the members could attend Decatur’s funeral (which was in Washington, DC).84 
On hearing accounts of the incident, Stephen’s widow, Susan, blamed the seconds for the 
death of her husband, because they did not halt the duel after Barron and Decatur’s verbal 
exchange.  Bainbridge’s position looks especially suspect given how low he was on Decatur’s 
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list of desired seconds: Decatur had chosen Bainbridge after Captains Thomas Macdonough, 
John Rodgers, and Charles Morris had refused on the grounds that the duel was unnecessary.85  
His close friend Richard Somers, his partner in the duels of his youth, had died when his ship 
mysteriously exploded on a dangerous mission in the First Barbary War.86  Decatur would 
probably have asked his friend Captain O.H. Perry (since he had served as a second to Perry in 
his duel with Heath), but Perry had recently died of yellow fever in Trinidad in August 1819.87 
Although Decatur considered Bainbridge his friend, many historians share Susan Decatur’s 
belief that Bainbridge harbored a secret “envy and jealousy” of her husband.88 When Bainbridge 
was assigned command of the Mediterranean squadron in 1815 for the Second Barbary War, he 
relinquished his profitable post at the Boston Navy Yard and sailed for Gibraltar, only to find out 
that Decatur had already secured treaties with Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, gaining even more 
laurels at Bainbridge’s expense.89  If his conduct towards Hull in the Boston Navy Yard 
controversy is an indicator of his personality, it is easy to believe that Bainbridge resented the 
unparalleled success of his junior.  Similarly, historians also credit Susan Decatur’s accusations 
against Captain Jesse Elliott.90  Elliott’s alleged grievance was that Decatur had supported Perry 
in a dispute between Perry and Elliott following the Battle of Lake Erie in which Perry had 
attempted arrange for Elliott to be tried by a tribunal.  One historian even calls Elliott “an 
inveterate intriguer with his own agenda,” and argues that he was trying to take out his disdain 
for Perry on Decatur through Barron.91 
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The Barron/Decatur Duel was certainly adopted by the public as another example of the 
tragic results of dueling, but the extent to which it affected the Navy is less obvious.  It was the 
last duel fought between the officers of this generation (although this might be partly because 
after Porter’s resignation and the relatively young deaths of Perry in 1819, Decatur in 1820, and 
Thomas Macdonough in 1825, there was less serious competition).  A more likely explanation 
can be found in Susan Decatur’s attacks on Bainbridge and Elliott.  Commodore Perry had 
entrusted documents to her husband relating to Elliott’s misconduct before he left for South 
America, (where he died).  After Decatur’s funeral, Susan published the papers for the purpose 
of “exposing to the world the real character of Captain Elliott as some punishment for the base 
and assassin-like part that he acted towards my beloved husband.”92  In a later memorial to the 
President and Senate, she accused Elliott of fomenting the duel out of “malice and cowardice,” 
and Bainbridge of vengeful jealousy in approving a duel on such dangerous terms.93  Similar 
attacks were made from other sources, such as an anonymous letter in a Hagerstown, Maryland 
newspaper that criticized Bainbridge for failing to halt the duel.94 
Had these accusations come from a man, the offended officers could have issued a challenge 
to redress their honor, but there was little a gentleman could do to protect his reputation from a 
grieved widow of a national icon.  The affair clearly damaged their reputations, especially in the 
somewhat anti-dueling climate that prevailed throughout much of America.  In some ways, 
Susan’s agitation robbed the public “affair of honor” of its honor.  Curiously, she did not speak 
ill of Barron who, like her husband, had also risked his life to resolve a conflict of honor. 95 But 
even if Barron escaped with his reputation somewhat intact, the aftermath of the duel 
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demonstrated that serving as a second – usually so respectable a role– now carried the risk of 
drawing accusations of dishonor from the family of the victim.  As historian Robert Baldwick 
explains in his book The Duel, “The most effective weapon used against dueling … has 
undoubtedly been ridicule.”96 
A final explanation as to how the Barron/Decatur duel helped to suppress the practice could 
be that the death of Decatur, who was beloved by almost the entire officer corps, demonstrated to 
the middle-aged men the high price of resolving disputes at gunpoint. One example that 
illuminates this possibility occurred on the dueling field immediately after the two men had fired, 
and were both injured on the ground.  Rodgers approached Barron and asked gruffly (and 
without any of the courtesies that were typical of conversation between gentlemen at the time) 
“are you much hurt?” Rodgers and Barron had not spoken since an earlier instance in which 
Rodgers had refused to greet Barron, so Barron replied, “Sir, when I last did you the honor to 
salute you, you did not return the compliment; and until that conduct is atoned for, you need 
never expect to receive an answer from me.”97 After the duel, Rodgers demanded an apology or a 
duel from the still bedridden Barron, but Elliott and Thomas Macdonough were able to craft a 
compromise letter disavowing any feelings of disrespect between the two men.98  
Compared to the previous dispute between the two men after the war with Tripoli, it took 
remarkably little effort to reach an agreement between Barron and Rodgers.  Previously, 
Rodgers’ offense at Barron’s conduct was largely unsupported by evidence, and only a long 
delay and Rodgers’ new marriage were able to avoid the duel.  After the Barron/Decatur duel, 
however, Rodgers was willing to settle “amicably” to a direct insult comparatively quickly.  This 
change in attitude reveals a new take on dueling among Preble’s Boys in the aftermath of 
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Decatur’s death.  As Porter told Rodgers after Barron had snubbed him, it was “neither the time 
nor the place for further altercation.”99  In his 1822, Commodore Porter also made a point of 
condemning dueling as “a practice which disgraces human nature.”100 
Charles Stewart is another example of the shift in ideology among Preble’s Boys. He was an 
old friend of Decatur’s, and after Decatur’s death Stewart cracked down on dueling among his 
subordinates.101 In 1822, when he learned that two of his midshipmen planned to duel, he ended 
the affair by ordering that any officers involved in a duel would be relieved of their posts and 
sent home.102  As mentioned in the previous chapter, a similar incident occurred in 1823 on 
Stewart’s Pacific Cruise when Lieutenant Joshua Sands and another lieutenant planned to go 
ashore to duel.  Stewart issued orders that all officers were to remain on board the ship, and when 
the two junior officers attempted to leave anyway, he confronted them.  The Navy traditionally 
did little to interfere with officers’ dueling, so the lieutenants likely considered it their right as 
gentlemen officers.  However, when confronted by their captain, the second officer obeyed his 
orders, but Sands left – whereupon Stewart arrested him for six months.103  
                                                           
99
 Stevens, An Affair of Honor, 142. 
100
 Porter, Journal of a Cruise, 222. 
101
 Berube and Rodgaard, A Call to the Sea, 173. Stewart and Decatur went on their first wartime cruise together. 
102
 Ibid., 147. 
103
 Ibid., 173. 
94 
Conclusion 
 
Naval Historian Christopher McKee argues that the duel’s significance “has certainly been 
exaggerated in the early Navy,” and that it has been studied disproportionately by historians. 1  
He cites as evidence the fact that only one percent of the officers who left the Navy before 1815 
were victims of duels.  He further states that “dueling was all but entirely confined to the 
younger members of the corps,” because the younger officers were insecure in their identity.2  
However, McKee’s assessment of dueling in the early Navy has several major shortcomings. 
Firstly, McKee’s “one percent” statistic is misleading, because it includes everyone who 
resigned, was fired, or died.  However, McKee is unclear as to why dueling fatalities should be 
evaluated in the context of people leaving their jobs.  When dueling casualties are examined in 
terms of deaths, the number is substantially higher. Using his numbers for this period, five 
percent of all deaths in the officer corps came from dueling, or seven and nine percent of deaths 
not attributed to natural causes.3  More importantly, even these higher statistics do not account 
for the fact that many participants in duels did not die.  The point of a duel was to resolve a 
dispute; some duels did not have a single injury, so only examining deaths resulting from duels 
does not adequately represent the extent of the practice. 
Secondly, by choosing the end of the War of 1812 as the cutoff period, he isolates one of the 
most tumultuous periods in the officer corps, when there were a number of duels and challenges 
for duels issued between Preble’s Boys.  In fact, these senior officers of the Navy after the war 
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were the “younger members of the corps” in the period McKee writes about.  In this regard, his 
analysis ignores generational trends.   
Thirdly, while McKee is correct that most duels were fought by young officers (which holds 
true even including later duels with captains such as Perry, Decatur, and Barron), his analysis 
ignores the fact that there were many more junior officers than senior officers.  The difficulty 
that the Navy Department had in finding enough captains to staff its tribunals demonstrates how 
few captains there were in the Navy.  Furthermore, by looking only at duels, McKee again places 
too much emphasis on the duel itself.  As the examples of conflicts between the offices show, 
there was no shortage of challenges issued (or threatened) among Preble’s Boys.  These 
challenges came from captains who, like the junior officers, felt insecure in their identity.  While 
an officer might respond to a challenge out of a sense of obligation, the captains like Barron or 
Elliott who issued challenges put their life on the line because they felt a need to prove 
themselves.  Maturity mostly seems to have changed the specific motives for dueling.  As the 
officers aged, married, and had children, the causes of their duels shifted subtly from their need 
to obtain recognition for their bravery to their hypersensitivity about their reputations as 
gentlemen.  They were understandably reluctant to shoot each other for minor differences such 
as billiard games or innocent name-calling.  Since the duel was no longer the end goal (and the 
officers had already demonstrated their courage in battle), there was no need for these conflicts 
to end on the dueling field, and they were usually avoided by the older officers.  Only when a 
man’s bravery was called into question (for a defeat or capitulation, such as the surrender of the 
Chesapeake to the Leopard) or when the seconds neglected their responsibility to reach a 
compromise (as many believe happened in the Barron/Decatur duel) did the older officers find 
themselves on the dueling field.   
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After the Barron/Decatur duel, affairs of honor became less common among Preble’s Boys 
because they were no longer as secure a means to maintain an officer’s honorable reputation.  
Additionally, officers such as Charles Stewart took a firmer role on suppressing the practice 
among their juniors: in this regard, Lieutenant Sands served as more than just an example of 
Preble’s Boys disciplining the lieutenants; his arrest and court-martial represent a broader 
movement among the Navy’s leaders beginning after the Barron/Decatur duel to enforce 
discipline over personal honor.  The same ideological shift in the Navy Department and the 
senior officers punished David Porter one year later for his publications that damaged the public 
perception of the service in order to protect his reputation.  
The influence of these changes, of course, should not be overstated.  The Barron/Decatur 
duel brought the tragic repercussions of dueling home to the Navy in the way the Burr/Hamilton 
duel did not; but like the Burr/Hamilton duel in American society, it did not put an end to the 
practice.  Few substantial efforts were made to ban dueling in the naval regulations until 1840, 
and the practice was not actually banned until 1862.4 However, the changes that took place 
between 1820 and 1825 held shaped the trajectory of the ideological development of the Navy 
officer corps.  Some of Preble’s Boys had long careers where they continued the Navy’s efforts 
to subordinate personal honor to discipline, particularly among younger officers.  Several of 
Preble’s Boys such as Barron served as commandants of the Navy’s first shore schools for 
officers, which were established in beginning in the 1830s.5  Charles Stewart was also a strong 
advocate for the US Naval Academy at Annapolis, which was founded in 1845.6  Historian 
William Oliver Stevens refers to the early Navy as “the days when there was no Naval Academy 
to set a tone for the Service, to teach obedience and subordination….  This fiery individualism 
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led to heart-burnings and jealousies between officers of rank over promotion, claims, counter 
claims, and … to personal feuds that split the Service wide apart.”7  It seems almost certain that 
some of the captains used the educational institutions to impart discipline and a restrained sense 
of honor on their charges. 
Furthermore, Preble’s Boy’s didn’t fully leave the Navy in the decades after their service.  
Besides those like Barron, Hull, and Stewart who remained for a further fifteen or twenty years 
after this period, their progeny continued their legacy.  Officers such as Lieutenant John “Mad 
Jack” Percival, a protégé’s of Hull’s who served with him at the Boston Navy Yard, carried their 
values forward with them as they advanced to the rank of captain. 8  In a passage that could just 
as easily been written by Hull himself, Percival wrote in 1839, “the spirit which is in many 
instances manifested in the service … with frequent appeals made through the public prints to 
public opinion, is striking at, if not sapping the very foundation of the service.”9  Other officers 
had younger siblings who sought to emulate their older brothers and learn from their mistakes.  
Oliver Hazard Perry’s brother, Mathew Calbraith, for example, became a captain and 
commanded the expedition that opened Japan to foreign trade in 1854.  The younger Perry was 
particularly conscious of his family’s history of difficulties with unruly subordinates.10  Finally, a 
startling number of Preble’s Boys had sons or nephews who became highly distinguished naval 
officers in the US and/or Confederate Navies.  The list includes Commodore Rodgers’ son, Rear 
Admiral John Rodgers; Commodore James Barron’s adopted Nephew, Commodore Samuel 
Barron III; and Commodore Porter’s son Admiral David Dixon Porter and the commodore’s 
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adopted son Admiral David Farragut.11  Farragut would later remark before the Battle of Mobile 
Bay, “We have no better seamen in the service today than those gallant fellows Bainbridge, 
Decatur, Hull, Perry, Porter, and Charles Stewart.”12 
 
Coda 
Today, the role of personal honor and the US military officer corps is still a contentious issue 
in certain matters of government policy.  The honor of Preble’s Boys was – at its core – a boys’ 
code, in that it governed only gentlemen.  Women could not usually participate in conflicts of 
honor in a meaningful way; at most they could witness its performance, and even then, their 
judgment was suspect.  James Barron once wrote that he believed gentlemen should “touch as 
delicately as possible, upon reports said to come from females, intended to affect injuriously the 
character of any one; and that … I should never think of introducing them as authority [to 
witness the deeds or words of a gentleman].  Females … ought to have nothing to do in 
controversies of this kind.”13  Men like Barron distrusted women in the belief that they were 
easily deceived or hopelessly naïve.  This mentality required gentlemen to treat women with a 
certain measure of protective care.  As Fletcher Pratt explains, for gentlemen in the early 1800s, 
“it was indelicate to mention any woman’s name, orally or in writing, unless she was being born, 
married, or dying.”14  This treatment of women extended decades past the lives of Preble’s Boys. 
Perhaps the most obvious recent incident of controversy over the gendered nature of US 
military officers’ code of honor is the integration of military academies.  In particular, the 
Virginia Military Institute was one of the last military colleges to integrate women (and probably 
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one of the last public schools in the United States to do so) in 1997. 15  As might be expected in a 
school designed to produce both military officers and southern gentlemen simultaneously, the 
VMI always placed an especially strong emphasis on developing an ‘honorable’ cadet corps.  
Opponents of integrating women into the college argued that their inclusion would hinder the 
school’s mission of imparting the cadets with a traditional sense of honor, because, if women 
were admitted and treated equally, then men had little opportunity to display their chivalric 
grace.  By implication, if male cadets were unable to enact the full range of practices 
traditionally associated with honorable behavior, some proponents of an all-male VMI believed 
that the cadets could not become ideal military officers.16 
In a service like the Navy, which places so much emphasis on tradition, the historical 
connotations of the Navy’s motto of “Honor, Courage, Commitment,” will not likely be 
forgotten.  Since it appears that honor will remain a core value of the Navy for the foreseeable 
future, the service will almost certainly need to continue its efforts to adapt the meaning and role 
of officers’ code of honor to suit the changing times. 
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Appendix 
Preble's Boys Mentioned in this Paper who Survived the War of 1812 
Names  Date of Birth Dates of Captain Commission Especially Renowned Victories or Defeats 
John 
Rodgers 11 July, 1772 5 March, 1799 
Commanded Mediterranean Squadron in the First Barbary 
War 
James 
Barron 
15 September, 
1768 22 May,1799 Captain of Chesapeake in encounter with Leopard 
William 
Bainbridge 7 May, 1774 20 May, 1800 
• Commanded first US warship captured in the Quasi-War 
• Captured while commanding Philadelphia in 1803 
• Captured British frigate Java in 1812, Commanded 
Mediterranean Squadron in the Second Barbary War 
Hugh G. 
Campbell ? 16 October, 1800 –– 
Stephen 
Decatur 5 January, 1779 16 February, 1804 
• Burned the captured Philadelphia in Tripoli in 1804 
• Captured British frigate Macedonia in 1812 
• Commanded Mediterranean Squadron victoriously in 
Second Barbary War 
Charles 
Stewart 28 July, 1778 22 April, 1806 
• Participated in Decatur's raid on Philadelphia in 1803 
• Captured two British warships in a single engagement 
in 1815. 
Isaac Hull 9 March, 1773 23 April, 1806 Captured British frigate Guerriere in first equal, single-ship 
action of the War of 1812 
Isaac 
Chauncey 
20 February, 
1772 24 April, 1806 Commanded US forces on Great Lakes in the War of 1812 
John Shaw 1773 27 Aug, 1807 –– 
David Porter 1 February, 1780 2 July, 1812 
• Captured the first British warship of the War of 1812 
• Raided British commerce in Pacific in War of 1812  
Samuel 
Evans ? 4 July, 1812 –– 
Charles 
Gordon ? 2 March, 1813 Flag captain of Chesapeake in encounter with Leopard 
Arthur 
Sinclair 
February 28, 
1780 24 March 1813 –– 
Oliver 
Hazard 
Perry 
23 August, 
1785 10 September, 1813 
Commanded victorious American forces at the Battle of 
Lake Erie in 1813 
Thomas 
Macdonough 
31 December, 
1783 11 September 1814 
Commanded victorious American forces at the Battle of 
Lake Champlain in 1814 
Joseph 
Bainbridge 10 May 1780 23 September 1814 –– 
Jesse D. 
Elliot July 14, 1782 27 March 1818 Participated in Battle of the Lake Erie in 1813 
Sources: Commission dates are from: United States Navy, "Officers of the War of 1812: Captains," Naval History and Heritage 
Command, http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/war1812/list1.htm; dates of birth from: American National Biography Online 
(Oxford University Press, 2000), http://www.anb.org; several birthdates are not known, and Joseph Bainbridge’s date of birth is 
questionable, as the only location where I found it mentioned was: FamilyTreemaker Online, “Joseph Bainbridge: (b. May 10, 
1780, d. November 17, 1824),”(Ancestry.com, 2009), http://familytreemaker.genealogy.com/users/b/u/c/Glenna-Buck-
CO/WEBSITE-0001/UHP-0642.html 
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